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How do we define executive power in the Constitution of the 
United States?  Throughout our history, this question has been 
hotly contested, including among the framers themselves.  At 
the Philadelphia Convention in 1787, George Mason thought 
that the executive branch should be headed by a council of three, 
with one member from the northern, middle, and southern 
states respectively.1  Alexander Hamilton, on the other hand, 
argued that the best safeguard for liberty and security would be 
an elected monarch with life tenure.2  Less than a decade later, 
Alexander Hamilton once again found himself in a dispute over 
the scope of the executive power, this time with fellow framer 
James Madison, who argued that President Washington’s 
Neutrality Proclamation was an unconstitutional usurpation of 
Congress’ power to declare war.3  Alexander Hamilton disagreed, 
 
1.  THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 
DEBATES 23 (Ralph Ketcham ed. 1986) (“If the [e]xecutive is vested in three 
[p]ersons, one chosen from the northern, one from the middle, and one from 
the [s]outhern [s]tates, will it not contribute to quiet the [m]inds of the [p]eople, 
[and] convince them that there will be proper attention paid to their respective 
[c]oncerns?”). 
2.  Id. at 54–55 (“As to the [e]xecutive . . . [t]he [e]nglish model was the 
only good one on this subject. The [h]ereditary interest of the King was so 
interwoven with that of the Nation, and his personal emoluments so great, that 
he was placed above the danger of being corrupted from abroad, and at the 
same time was both sufficiently independent and sufficiently controled [sic], to 
answer the purpose of the institution at home. . . . Let the [e]xecutive also be 
for life.”). 
3.  NOAH FELDMAN, THE THREE LIVES OF JAMES MADISON 375–84 (2017). 
2https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss1/5
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arguing that because the power was neither legislative nor 
judicial, it was executive under the Constitution.4  Given that 
two of the framers disagreed so strongly on the meaning of 
“executive power” in the text of the Constitution that they helped 
write only six years earlier, we can safely assume that the 
Constitution leaves much of the executive power to be 
determined in political fights and decisions over time. 
In the first clause of Article II of our Constitution, the 
framers wrote that the “executive Power shall be vested in a 
President of the United States of America.”5  This opening line 
settled a key debate between the framers at the convention: 
whether to have an executive council or a single unitary 
executive, with the latter winning.6  However, while the 
Constitution settles this debate over a singular or plural 
executive, it does not specifically define executive power.  It does, 
however, enumerate powers and duties in Sections Two and 
Three.7  These powers and duties are undeniably vested in the 
president, and thus we owe it to the text to examine their scope 
and implications for any broader executive power advocated by 
some scholars. 
This article is focused on the Opinions Clause, which 
empowers the president to “require the Opinion, in writing, of 
the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments upon 
any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices.”8  
The Opinions Clause is the only power set forth in Article II that 
speaks to the president’s role in the day-to-day administration 
of the civilian government.9  Clearly, it assumes a president that 
is at the top of the executive branch hierarchy with respect to 
the flow of information.10  The president may demand opinions 
 
4.  Id. at 377.  
5.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1. 
6.  See supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text (outlining the 
disagreements). 
7.  U.S. CONST. art. II, §§ 2–3. 
8.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
9.  Of course, modern unitary scholars will argue that the Vesting Clause 
and the Take Care Clause speak to the president’s day-to-day role in the 
administration to an even greater degree than the Opinions Clause.  However, 
as this article explains, those clauses leave great ambiguity in the exact powers 
of the Presidency, while the Opinions Clause is undeniably clear and specific. 
10.  See generally Akhil Reed Amar, Some Opinions on the Opinion 
Clause, 82 VA. L. REV. 647 (1996). 
3
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on any subject related to the duties of the particular executive 
agency, meaning that there is nothing within the executive 
branch that he cannot discover.  Professor Akhil Amar wrote 
that the clause yields “rich insights into the scope, limits, and 
nature of the American Presidency, with implications both 
timely and timeless.”11  Amar’s statement has never been 
timelier, and we should answer the call to examine in greater 
detail those important implications. 
Given Alexander Hamilton’s position on an elected 
monarch, it is perhaps not surprising that he called the clause a 
“mere redundancy.”12  Many unitary scholars, or those who 
believe in a strong and broad substantive reading of the Vesting 
Clause, agree.13  Contrary to Alexander Hamilton’s view, 
however, the Opinions Clause is in no way redundant.  It serves 
an important purpose for the presidency and our constitutional 
structure as a whole.  Although it is a limited power that implies 
further limits on the broader executive power, it is not a power 
to be dismissed.  In fact, the Clause vests the president with the 
authority to access any and all information within the duties of 
the federal government.  What the president can do with this 
information depends on what laws congress has passed and, 
perhaps more importantly, the political skill of the particular 
president.  If, for example, congress delegated broad 
unrestricted authority to the president over a particular 
statutory framework, then the president can use the Opinions 
Power to become more informed of the proposed actions of his 
officers, and then correct any actions he wishes.14  However, the 
Opinions Clause is limited by what it does not say: it does not 
give the president an absolute power to issue orders, to fire 
officers, or, as is important in the modern debates on 
 
11.  Id. at 647. 
12.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 74 (Alexander Hamilton). 
13.  See, e.g., Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Hail to the Chief 
Administrator: The Framers and the President’s Administrative Powers, 102 
YALE L. J. 991, 1004 (1993); see also Amar, supra note 10, at 648–49 (arguing 
that it is acceptable to have constitutional redundancies and, thus, we should 
not seek a meaning for the sake of meaning).  
14.  Here, the President may take any corrective action because Congress 
has delegated unrestricted authority to the President.  As this article will show, 
the Opinions Clause allows Congress to place certain restrictions on what 
corrective actions the President may take.  See infra Part III(B),  
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss1/5
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presidential overreach into the FBI, to demand direct 
communications with inferior officers.15  Thus, the Opinions 
Clause represents a compromise by the framers: the nuts and 
bolts of the executive power will shift based on the political 
battles of the day—just as we saw in the dispute between 
Alexander Hamilton and James Madison over the 
constitutionality of the Neutrality Proclamation—but the one 
constant embodied in the Opinions Clause is the president’s 
authority to arm himself with information.16 
This article will analyze the Clause’s text, its history and 
intent, and its potential functions as a power.  Part II catalogues 
much of the prior scholarship on the Opinions Clause, which 
generally fits into two categories: the anti-unitary approach, 
which argues that a substantive reading of the Vesting Clause 
renders the Opinions Clause redundant,17 and the unitary 
response, which essentially accepts that redundancy.18  To some 
extent, both sides miss the mark.  The unitary approach 
misreads the text, assigning great substantive weight to the 
descriptive Vesting Clause, while assigning descriptive status to 
the substantive Opinions Clause.  The anti-unitary approach, on 
the other hand, neglects to analyze the substantive powers of the 
Opinions Clause and what they mean for the constitutional 
nature of the presidency.  As a result, while anti-unitary 
 
15.  Cf. Amar, supra note 10, at 667 (arguing that the power over principal 
officers contains the power over the inferior officers). 
16.  The same argument applies to the Decision of 1789, in which the First 
Congress voted to grant the President the power of removal.  Steven G. 
Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 
104 YALE L.J. 541, 642–62 (1994) (discussing the disagreements in Congress 
on the merits, the need, and the decision to grant the President with removal 
authority). This decision was a political decision made by Congress that can be 
reversed by a future Congress.  To some extent, the debate itself answers the 
question of whether the Constitution solved the removal problem.   
17.  See Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the 
Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 31–38, 72 (1994); see also Martin S. 
Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1795–98 (1996); 
Morton Rosenberg, Congress’s Prerogative over Agencies and Agency 
Decisionmakers: The Rise and Demise of the Reagan Administration’s Theory 
of the Unitary Executive, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 627, 689 (1989) (stating “[a] 
broad reading of the Take Care Clause would have the effect of reducing the 
Opinions Clause . . . to surplusage”). 
18.  See generally Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 16; see also THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 74, supra note 12; Amar, supra note 10, at 648–49. 
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scholars are correct in that the Opinions Clause refutes a 
substantive reading of the Vesting Clause, their position is 
undermined by their failure to advocate for a definable 
alternative.  This article fills this space. 
Part III focuses on the text of the Opinions Clause and 
analyzes its implications for the Presidency.  The text vests the 
president with discretionary power to inform himself of the 
workings of the entire executive branch.  On the other hand, the 
limited nature of this power suggests that the Constitution does 
not vest the president with unenumerated powers.  For example, 
the Opinions Clause grants the president the authority to 
require a principal officer report to him, but it does not grant the 
president the power to remove that officer.  To close this 
argument, the Opinions Clause and the broader structure of 
Article II is used to refute the unitary argument that the Vesting 
Clause fills in any of the gaps in power left by the Opinions 
Clause. 
Part IV assigns the Clause its historical significance by 
analyzing its introduction and adoption at the Philadelphia 
Convention.  Then, it is shown that the Clause serves James 
Madison’s and the framers’ purpose of the presidency: to be a 
republican check on a factious legislature.  To illustrate, Part V 
analyzes President Washington’s use of the Opinions Clause to 
prepare and execute a response to the Whiskey Rebellion.  From 
this historical example, an inference is made of three Opinions 
Clause powers vested uniquely in the president: the Unitary 
Political and Legislative Power, the Unitary Judicial Power, and 
the Unitary Executive Power.  These three powers enable the 
president to protect the executive branch from both legislative 
and judicial encroachments, garner political support amongst 
the electorate, and unify the executive branch even in situations 
where congress has restricted the president’s legal authority. 
Finally, Part VI examines the recent practices of President 
Trump through the lens of the Opinions Clause, namely, 
President Trump’s attempt to use the Opinions Clause for his 
initial justification for the firing of former FBI Director James 
Comey.  This Part includes the discovery of potentially troubling 
facts centered around the current President’s actions which tend 
to compromise the independence of the Department of Justice.  
In contrast to President Washington, who used the power of the 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss1/5
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Opinions Clause to further his legislative, judicial, and executive 
policies in crushing the Whiskey Rebellion, President Trump’s 
actions suggest a reason the framers granted the president this 
more limited power—to allow Congress the flexibility to regulate 
the execution of the law and prevent presidential abuse of power.  
Additionally, after documenting the evidence as we now know it, 
this Section turns to the steps congress can take on the basis of 
the correct reading of Article II.  Congress can insulate inferior 
officers such as the FBI Director from reporting directly to the 
president, prevent presidents from ordering politically 
motivated investigations, and protect any officer, including 
Special Counsel Robert Mueller, from at-will removal. 
Generally speaking, this article analyzes an often-ignored 
clause in our Constitution and finds a significant power grant.  
In so doing, the wisdom of the Opinions Clause emerges.  It is a 
great power, but it is limited, and its limitations grant us and 
our representatives the flexibility to strike the right balance 
between preserving presidential power and enabling congress’ 
power to ensure fair and independent law enforcement. 
 
II. Previous Scholarship on the Opinions Clause 
 
Although there is little scholarship that focuses solely on the 
Opinions Clause,19 scholars have used the Clause as a pawn in 
the broader arguments over executive power. This broader 
debate generally centers around what it means to have a unitary 
executive.  The key textual hook for the unitary executive theory 
is Article II’s Vesting Clause: “the executive Power shall be 
vested in a President of the United States of America.”20  On one 
side, proponents of a strong Unitary Executive believe that this 
Vesting Clause grants all federal executive powers to the 
 
19.  The only other article focused solely on the Opinions Clause is Akhil 
Amar’s work, Some Opinions on the Opinions Clause.  See generally Amar, 
supra note 10.  Amar usefully breaks down the text of the clause and assigns 
certain principles to each of its key phrases.  Id. at 661–62.  For instance, the 
word “respective” presents a hub and spoke model for the President and the 
executive branch.  Id.  The word contemplates many different spokes, or 
principal officers responsible for their one executive department, with the 
President serving as the hub responsible to the American people for the whole 
branch.  Id. 
20.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1. 
7
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president alone, unless otherwise restricted by the 
Constitution.21  The anti-unitary scholars, on the other hand, 
believe that the Vesting Clause is a naming clause—settling the 
debate that there will be one president—rather than granting 
any substantive powers.  A naming function allows congress to 
create agencies independent of the president’s will; for example, 
removal restrictions.22  Within this broader debate, the Opinions 
Clause is generally first cited by anti-unitary scholars as 
evidence that the Vesting Clause is not a substantive power 
grant, with the unitary scholars limiting their analysis of the 
clause to rebuttal of this argument. 
 
A. The Anti-Unitary Approach 
 
The anti-unitary scholars use the presence of the Opinions 
Clause to negate any substantive meaning in the Vesting 
Clause.  If the Vesting Clause actually granted all executive 
power in the president (as the unitary scholars argue), there 
would be no need to enumerate the powers later listed in Article 
 
21.  See generally Steven G. Calabresi, The Vesting Clauses as Power 
Grants, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 1377 (1994). 
22.  Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 17, at 9; see also Steven G. Calabresi 
& Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural 
Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153, 1166 (1992) (explaining how, as a result of 
the lack of debate, the Constitution does not vest the power in any one body, 
and thus the authority must either come from the Vesting Clause, the Take 
Care Clause, the Appointments Clause, or perhaps even the Necessary and 
Proper Clause).  Alternatively, the power may come from a law passed by 
Congress and signed by the President.  Id.  To illustrate the power’s 
importance, Professors Calabresi and Rhodes, unitary executive theorists, list 
the removal power with one of the three executive powers that must be vested 
in the President through the Vesting Clause  Id.; see also Michael W. 
McConnell, The Logical Structure of Article Two 67 (unpublished manuscript) 
(on file with Buffalo Law Review), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/research-
faculty/colloquium/constitutionallaw/documents/2016_Fall_McConnell_Art.pd
f (explaining that limitations on the President’s constitutionally guaranteed 
executive power have many implications for the function of our government).  
The removal power is the most commonly cited power in these debates 
precisely because we’ve come to believe that ultimate accountability lies with 
removal from office.  Id.  Thus, from the first Congress, to the Andrew Johnson 
impeachment proceedings, up to the modern-day dispute over the independent 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, the President’s right to remove 
officers has been hotly contested.  Id.  It’s a striking mystery, as Professor 
McConnell has pointed out, that the framers at the convention did not speak 
clearly to which branch would be vested with the Removal power.  Id. 
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss1/5
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II, including the Opinions Clause.  The Opinions Clause is 
noteworthy because it is such a seemingly strange power to be 
singled out in writing when most readers would assume it to be 
encompassed by executive power.23  Indeed, it seems obvious.  
Professors Sunstein and Lessig, in The President and The 
Administration, build on this argument by pointing to the 
history of the Clause at the convention, which originally 
included the chief justice alongside executive officers as subject 
to this power.24  The chief justice was ultimately removed from 
the Clause, thus leaving the president without the Opinions 
Power over the chief justice.25  From this, Sunstein and Lessig 
deduce that the Opinions Clause is necessary as a power grant, 
thus negating a substantive Vesting Clause.26  Underlying this 
argument is the interpretative canon that redundant readings, 
particularly of constitutional clauses, should be avoided.  Anti-
unitary scholars have thus cautioned against overly broad 
readings of both the Vesting Clause and the Take Care Clause 
that render the Opinions Clause (and the other power-grants in 
Article II, Section Two) surplusage.27 
Still, the anti-unitary argument contains a trace of a unitary 
executive theory: the Opinions Power is vested in the president 
alone and cannot be restricted by congress.  Professors Sunstein 
and Lessig, in their conservative reading,28 state that the 
 
23.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 74, supra note 12 (considering it “a mere 
redundancy” that comes with the office). 
24.  Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 17, at 33–34. 
25.  While this seems clear, President Washington requested the opinion 
of Chief Justice John Jay, who cited the Opinions Clause and the removal of 
the Chief Justice from it as reason that he could not offer his opinion to the 
President.  Letter from John Jay et al., Supreme Court Justices, Supreme 
Court of the U.S., to George Washington, U.S. President (August 8, 1793), 
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-13-02-0263.   
26.  Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 17, at 34; see also Calabresi & Prakash, 
supra note 16, at 627.  Professors Calabresi and Prakash reject this analog; of 
course the executive power in the Vesting Clause does not cover the Chief 
Justice who is in a coequal branch of government, but we should not infer from 
this natural and constitutionally-mandated assumption that the President 
then also needs the Opinions Clause to have substantive power over executive 
officers. 
27.  Rosenberg, supra note 17, at 689; see also Peter M. Shane, The 
Originalist Myth of the Unitary Executive, 19 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 323, 343–44 
(2016); Edward H. Stiglitz, Unitary Innovations and Political Accountability, 
99 CORNELL L. REV. 1133, 1142–43 (2014). 
28.  See Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 17, at 32–38.  (offering two readings 
9
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Opinions Clause at least serves as the line that congress cannot 
cross (as opposed to other lines congress may cross such as, say, 
restricting presidential power to fire the officer).29  In this sense, 
they argue that the Opinions Clause establishes a unitary 
administration with one line of executive officials who are all 
responsible to the president through the Opinions Power.30  
Professors Sunstein and Strauss classify the power as 
procedural, allowing a president to establish a coherent 
regulatory agenda, even if other substantive powers are 
limited.31  Professor Strauss subsequently compares the clause 
to the Commander-in-Chief Clause, which clearly establishes a 
direct and affirmative presidential power.  The Opinions Clause, 
by contrast, provides for officers with duties, suggesting that the 
president will play a more passive and managerial role over the 
 
of the Opinions Clause: the conservative and the radical).  While the 
conservative reading is described above and built upon in this article, the 
radical reading construes the Opinions Clause together with the Inferior 
Officer Appointments Clause to establish a fourth branch beyond the 
President’s reach.  Id.  The Opinions Clause refers to “Principal Officers” while 
the Inferior Officer’s Clause refers to the heads of departments.  Id.  These two 
terms imply two separate officers, and thus the heads of departments are part 
of some headless fourth branch not subject to the president’s Opinions Power.  
Id.  Both anti-unitary and unitary scholars alike have rejected this argument, 
it is doubted that the framers intended an entire branch of government to be 
implied by the difference between two terms, particularly because Articles I, 
II, and III lay out a strong structural assumption that there will only be three 
branches.  Id.; see also Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: 
Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573 (1984) 
(attributing the different terms to unsophisticated drafting on behalf of the 
framers).  
29.  Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 17, at 34. 
30.  See infra note 59 and accompanying text. 
31.  Cass R. Sunstein & Peter L. Strauss, The Role of the President and 
OMB in Informal Rulemaking, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 181, 200 (1986); see also 
Strauss, supra note 28, at 574.  In this second article, Professor Strauss traces 
the Opinions Power thread through the modern era of presidents beginning 
with President Kennedy, and then picking up force with Presidents Carter, 
Reagan, Bush, and Clinton, who each utilized the Opinions Power by 
establishing the Office of Management and Budget and then requiring that 
each agency report proposed regulations through it.  Strauss, supra note 28, at 
574.  Strauss comments that the Clause suggests that the information could 
be received prior to the action being taken, even if the president may be 
powerless to stop an independent agency from taking such an action.  Id.  
Nevertheless, the president must be able to know that the action is coming.  
Id.  Part III will expand on the Opinions Clause and its unitary function with 
respect to independent agencies. 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss1/5
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civilian administration.32 
In sum, while the anti-unitary scholars argue that the 
Opinions Clause establishes a line congress cannot cross, they 
maintain that its existence in the Constitution negates a 
substantive reading of the Vesting Clause. 
 
B. The Unitary Response 
 
In response, unitary scholars first assert that it is okay for 
the Opinions Clause to be redundant.  Professor Amar cautions 
against inventing meanings for the sake of avoiding redundancy, 
citing the entire Bill of Rights as potentially redundant.33  In 
fact, Alexander Hamilton in Federalist No. 74 called the clause 
a “mere redundancy.”34  Unitary scholars further insist that the 
Clause’s redundancy does not suggest that it serves no purpose.  
Professors Calabresi and Prakash argue that the Clause is a 
truism emphasizing the Vesting Clause’s hierarchy.35  Perhaps 
most importantly, they argue that the Clause served a historical 
purpose at the Convention, easing the harmful effects of a 
unitary executive to those in favor of an executive council.  The 
Clause aimed at alleviating fears that a single president would 
lack advice, an impetus for a clause that ensured the president 
would have a cabinet.36 
In Hail to the Chief Administrator, Prakash further argues 
that the historical context of the Clause’s proposal and debate at 
the Convention indicates the Vesting Clause confers all 
executive power to the president.37  As he and Calabresi 
 
32.  See generally Peter L. Strauss, A Softer Formalism, 124 HARV. L. REV. 
F. 55, 59 (2011).  
33. Amar, supra note 10, at 648–49; see also Calabresi & Prakash, supra 
note 16, at 585 (pointing to the Tenth Amendment as a constitutional 
redundancy). 
34.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 74, supra note 12. 
35.  Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 16, at 585; see also Amar, supra note 
10, at 651 (arguing that the Clause serves to “clarify and exemplify”). 
36.  Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 16, at 629, n.393. (“Ellsworth, 
writing as The Landholder, pointed to the Opinions Clause to assuage the fears 
of those who felt that the President would be bereft of advice”). 
37.  Prakash, supra note 13, at 1005 (stating “the Framers arguably 
included this provision to facilitate presidential control of discretion. The 
President may demand opinions in order to determine how he should execute 
federal law.”) (emphasis in original). 
11
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highlight, the Clause was introduced by Gouverneur Morris and 
Charles Pinckney—two framers strongly in support of a unitary 
executive—leaving them to doubt any reading of the clause that 
interprets it as a limit instead of a truism restating the power 
granted in the Vesting Clause.38  In addition to language closely 
resembling the Opinions Clause,39 the original proposal provided 
for a council of state who would “assist the President” in his final 
decision-making responsibility, suggesting to Prakash an 
expansive view of presidential power.40  Although the Committee 
of Eleven deleted the provisions Prakash cites here, he argues 
that the finalized text of the Opinions Clause mirrors the 
original proposal, and thus we should not read it as divorced 
from Morris and Pinckney’s original intent.41 
 
38.  Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 16, at 630–31. 
39.  Prakash, supra note 13, at 1006, n.107 (pointing out similarities 
between the original proposal, which stated “he may require the written 
opinions of any one or more of the . . . members . . . . and every officer 
abovementioned shall be responsible for his opinion on the affairs relating to 
his particular Department” and the language which states “he may require the 
Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive 
Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective 
Offices”). 
40.  Id. (explaining that, under the original proposal, the president would 
be the chief administrator with the authority to command all of the executive 
department heads). 
41.  Id.; see infra notes 115–36 and accompanying text for an 
interpretation of this history.  While it is true that the Opinions Clause mirrors 
one phrase in the original proposal, see Prakash, supra note 13, Prakash 
argues that because one portion of the Clause is the same, we should attach 
the meaning of the other original portions, such as cabinet members serving 
“at the pleasure of the president,” even though these parts were removed.  
However, they were removed for a reason.  Prakash argues that the context 
explains their removal and the other provisions were removed because the 
framers were afraid that providing for a council in the Constitution would 
allow the president to escape accountability, hence the removal of “Council of 
State” from the Clause.  Id.  To support this argument, he cites the 
simultaneous motion by George Mason for a plural executive, which was 
rejected by the same Committee of Eleven that revised the Opinions Clause.  
Id., at 1006.  The revisions were about preserving presidential accountability, 
according to Prakash, further supported by James Iredell’s statements at the 
North Carolina ratifying convention: essentially that the Opinions Clause 
maintains that it is the President who is accountable for the executive branch, 
not a Council of State.  Id.   
This argument might explain why the framers removed the Council of State 
provision from the original proposal, but it fails to explain why they removed 
provisions like assist the president, serve at the pleasure of the president, or 
that the president’s decision was final.  Each of these three proposals seems to 
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All in all, the unitary scholars argue that the Opinions 
Clause is largely redundant, restating the truism already found 
in the Vesting Clause.  Almost as an afterthought, they state 
that the Clause could plausibly foreclose the president from 
exercising the King’s prerogative to have his officers tend to his 
personal affairs.42  But otherwise, they disregard the limits on 
constitutional executive power that the Opinions Clause 
embodies. 
 
C. Finding the Clause’s True Meaning 
 
To a certain extent, both camps miss the true implications 
of the Opinions Clause for presidential power.  The unitary 
scholars misread the text of Article II.  They assign substantive 
powers to the Vesting Clause and prefer to read the far more 
limited Opinions Clause as a redundancy or a restated truism.  
However, this argument strains credulity.  Although some 
readers may find the Opinions Clause a strange presidential 
power to single out in the Constitution, it is an even stranger 
truism to repeat just for emphasis.  Assuming a substantive 
Vesting Clause, why would the framers choose to reiterate the 
power to require opinions from only principal officers and not the 
power to fire anybody at will or the power to issue directives?  
Surely, the latter two hypothetical redundancies would better 
support the unitary scholars’ vision of the Constitution. 
There is a far more plausible explanation that is more in line 
with the structure of Article II.  The Vesting Clause solves the 
 
uphold presidential accountability, so why would it make sense for the framers 
to strike them in the name of accountability?  Perhaps replacing “Council of 
State” with “principal officers” is significant for the reason Prakash states 
(though perhaps not).  However, if the framers truly wanted to preserve 
accountability, they would have said he may require the opinion, in writing, of 
the principal officers, who shall assist and serve at the pleasure of the president, 
and the president’s decision shall be final.”  However, they did not say this, and 
not because it did not occur to them; similar language was in Morris and 
Pinckney’s original proposal.  See infra notes 103–106 and accompanying text. 
The framers actually decided against including these strong powers. 
42. Amar, supra note 10, at 654 (describing how the framers included 
“duties of their . . . offices” to suggest that the president lacked the King’s 
authority to have a privy council tend to his personal affairs); Calabresi & 
Prakash, supra note 16, at 584–85. 
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key historical question whether there should be one president.43  
It is located in Section One, which we will call the Naming 
Section because it is surrounded by clauses that name the office 
and its characteristics.44  This context implies a non-substantive 
and naming Vesting Clause, not an all-encompassing power 
grant.  The Opinions Clause, by contrast, is located in Section 
Two, surrounded by the president’s other constitutional powers.  
The Opinions Clause not only refutes a substantive reading of 
the Vesting Clause, but it also becomes the very important 
substantive power grant detailed in this article. 
On the other hand, while the anti-unitary approach 
correctly identifies a non-substantive Vesting Clause, it fails to 
acknowledge the significance of the Opinions Clause aside from 
its worth in defeating any substantive reading of the Vesting 
Clause.  Yes, the Opinions Clause’s mere existence undermines 
the notion that the Vesting Clause grants any substantive 
executive powers, but this is not a strong enough argument to 
fully refute the unitary scholars’ approach.  Any reading of 
Article II that is based in part on the existence of the Opinions 
Clause needs to define the powers that the Clause actually vests 
in the president, not just describe what powers the Clause leaves 
out. 
In Some Opinions on the Opinion Clause, Professor Amar 
admirably offered several plausible interpretations of the 
Clause.  This textual analysis is built upon in Part III, infra.  
But, in some sense, the text does not tell the complete story.  
While the text strongly favors the substantive Opinions Clause 
reading, one needs to engage the unitary scholars on the original 
republican intent of the Presidency and how the Opinions 
Clause furthers that intent.  This is accomplished in Part IV, 
 
43.  See infra Part IV for a discussion of the framers’ concern over having 
one President or a plural executive council.  
44.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.  This article refers to Section One as the 
naming section because it identifies who will be vested with executive power 
(the president); the term of his office; the vice president; the manner for his 
election including naming the electors; the citizenship, age and residency 
requirements; the removal process (since amended by the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment); and the president’s compensation.  Section One closes with the 
oath of office, naming the moment when the citizen assumes the office of 
president and possesses the powers and duties subsequently vested by Section 
Two (“powers”) and Section Three (“duties”).  Id. 
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infra.  The analysis also needs to answer legitimate concerns 
about a more limited presidential power in practice, including, 
for instance, that executive branch accountability will suffer 
from a restricted removal power.  Part V, infra, analyzes how 
the Opinions Clause serves the president’s interests in these 
concerns and may even be better for the president than the 
“Damocles’ sword of removal.”45  Finally, analysis of the 
substantive Opinions Clause invites an example of the flexibility 
and safeguards it empowers us to design.  This constitutional 
flexibility is illustrated in Part VI, infra, rejecting the notion 
that congress is powerless to prevent presidential overreach 
with the FBI. 
 
III. The Textual Opinions Clause: Its Powers  
and its Limitations 
 
A proper analysis of the Opinions Clause should begin with 
its text and its place in the overall structure of Article II.  The 
first three sections of Article II divide into three distinct 
categories: the Naming Section One, the Powers Section Two, 
and the Duties Section Three.  Each of the clauses within these 
three sections fits within this taxonomy, and each clause should 
be read in light of the company it keeps.  The Opinions Clause is 
located in the Powers Section, and thus we should analyze it as 
an important substantive power.  Part A examines the text of 
the Clause to describe the discretionary power that the Clause 
vests in the president and highlight how it is the only explicit 
textual power grant related to the president’s role over the day-
to-day administration.  Part B acknowledges the Opinions 
Clause is a limited power and examines the three negative 
implications for the broader executive power: (1) the president 
does not have an absolute power to issue directives to officers, as 
the Clause only vests the president with the power to require 
opinions from those officers, (2) the president does not have an 
absolute power to require inferior officers report to him directly, 
as the Clause only vests the president with the authority over 
the principal officers, and (3) the president does not have an 
absolute power to remove executive officers.  Given that this 
 
45.  Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 356 (1958). 
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third implication has been so often debated throughout our 
history, the unitary scholars’ counterarguments are then 
refuted—particularly that removal and other powers are 
granted by the Vesting Clause or other clauses in Article II. 
 
A. The Opinions Clause and its Undeniable Unitary  
Executive Power 
 
Regardless of one’s views of the Vesting Clause, the 
Opinions Clause is a clear power vested in the president alone.  
Stating that the president “may require the Opinion, in writing, 
of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, 
upon any Subject related to the Duties of their respective 
Offices,”46 the Clause establishes that the president has a 
textually-enumerated grant of power to require any principal 
officer to report to him.  Before turning to the specific text, it is 
important to reiterate the anti-unitary argument outlined 
above: congress cannot contravene, restrict, or regulate the 
ability of the president to have a principal officer give his or her 
opinion.47  In this sense, it is what unitary scholars think of the 
Vesting Clause: a textual power grant that cannot be infringed 
by the other branches. 
Article II’s overall structure and its other clauses also shed 
light on the interpretation of the Opinions Clause.  The Clause 
is located in Section Two, or the Powers Section, surrounded by 
the other enumerated power grants vested in the president.  The 
Clause’s neighbors, the Commander in Chief Clause, the Pardon 
Clause, the Treaty-Making Clause, and the Nominations and 
Vacancy Appointment Clause, are all important power grants 
that presidents often cite when taking each respective action.48  
 
46.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
47.  See Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 17, at 32–38 (exploring a 
conservative reading of the Clause); see also Amar, supra note 10, at 657–59 
(finding that “may require” signifies the president is in a unique constitutional 
position, as he is the top of the informational food chain within the executive 
branch).  Additionally, the State of the Union Clause, by comparison, grants 
the president the discretion to pick and choose what he shares with Congress, 
thereby tipping the balance between the three branches to the president 
regarding facts on the ground.  Amar, supra note 10, at 657–59.   
48.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2; see also Amar, supra note 10, at 652 
(collectively referring to the Clauses as the “opening triad” of power). 
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Interestingly, the Opinions Clause is the only one of these power 
grants that speaks to the president’s role in the day-to-day 
administration of the non-military executive branch.49  In this 
sense, the Opinions Clause represents the most important power 
for the unitary executive: the ability to have the entire executive 
branch responsible to him through opinions. 
Building on this context, the Opinions Clause’s text 
indicates that it confers on the president a substantive 
discretionary power.  He may require the principal officer to 
report to him, but, in line with the Clause’s location in Section 
Two, it places no duty on the president to take action.50  The 
president thus has unlimited discretion to exercise this 
authority when he sees fit.  Generally speaking,51 the president 
need not share an opinion that would negatively reflect on his 
administration or which is contradictory to his stated position.  
As a result, the president can only benefit from requiring an 
opinion.  However, as the unitary scholars point out, this clause 
implicates the president’s accountability for the flow of 
information within the executive branch.52  By telling us that the 
president has this power, the Constitution also tells us to hold 
the president accountable for informational breakdowns.  In 
other words, the president cannot stick his head in the sand to 
 
49.  As argued further below, the Appointments Clause deals exclusively 
with the picking of personnel.  Beyond choosing like-minded individuals, it 
does not explicitly grant any substantive control over those officers. 
50.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
51.  There are three potential wrinkles to the president’s complete 
discretion over the release of these opinions.  Firstly, the Freedom of 
Information Act could force disclosure of these opinions.  See Judicial Watch, 
Inc. v. Dep’t of Justice, 365 F.3d 1108, 1120 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (finding that 
executive privilege under FOIA does not apply to the attorney general, even if 
the attorney general is advising the president).  Secondly, these opinions could 
be subject to congressional or judicial subpoena.  The president could assert 
executive privilege to protect the opinions, but this strategy is not absolute.  
See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).  Finally, the negative 
opinion could leak, a recurring problem from administration to administration.  
One might argue that these officers violate their oaths of office when they leak, 
but the political harm to the president will be difficult to reverse.  In sum, while 
the opinion is mostly there for the president’s benefit, there could be situations 
where a president’s decision to sit on an opinion could backfire.  
52.  See infra Part IV(B) notes 145–47 and accompanying text for in 
illustration of this accountability; see also Amar, supra note 10, at 658–59; 
Prakash, supra note 13, at 1005. 
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shield himself.53  Furthermore, as Professors Prakash and Amar 
state, this discretionary power establishes the president as the 
chief administrator.54  The president’s discretionary authority to 
require that principal officers report to him suggests that he is 
above them in the executive hierarchy, at least in respect to the 
information in the executive branch. 
Relatedly, the Clause establishes an accountability on 
behalf of the executive officer.  By allowing for opinions in 
writing, the Clause enables the president to require the officer 
to provide a more thorough opinion, knowing that it could be 
memorialized with the officer’s name on it.55  However, most 
importantly, in writing suggests that the president will have 
this information in the form of evidence that he has the 
discretion to share as he sees fit.  Under a knowledge-is-power 
theory, the president can then use these reports as political 
evidence, either taking the fight to congress, or taking the report 
to the people to then hold congress responsible.56  As other 
scholars have pointed out, an opinion in writing can assist the 
president in a removal battle over an independent officer,57 
 
53. As explained below, the unitary scholars wrongly suggest that this 
means the president must also have unrestricted authority to take the action 
or overrule the action taken by the officer.  Rather, the accountability here is 
that the president must know about the fact at issue, and then either take the 
action under legal authority or inform us, his voters, to demand Congress put 
a stop to the action in question.  Contra Prakash, supra note 13.   
54.  See Amar, supra note 10, at 659; see also Prakash, supra note 13.  At 
the North Carolina ratifying convention, James Iredell stated that “in writing” 
would prevent presidential collusion with the Officer to falsify an opinion.  
JONATHAN ELLIOT, 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE 
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL 
CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA IN 1787,  at 108–10 (1888). Potential exposure of 
the written evidence would chill such improper influence by the President.  
While this is a valid point, it also shows that the clause contemplates potential 
limits on presidential ability to improperly influence the officers charged with 
executing the law. 
55.  See Amar, supra note 10, at 662.  This is not to say that the Opinions 
Power must always be in writing or have the officer’s name on it.  See id. at 
670. 
56.  See infra note 63 and accompanying text (explaining that “in writing,” 
so understood, is a greater power than private briefings in cabinet meetings, 
so we should not read a negative implication from this Clause that Congress 
could prohibit a principal officer from having a conversation with the president 
about such information).  The greater includes the lesser doctrine applies here.  
Id.; see also Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. 441, 449 (1850). 
57.  See infra Part V(B)(3); see also J. Gregory Sidak, The 
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either providing the cause itself, or giving the president evidence 
for the advice and consent of the Senate or the ruling of an 
Article III judge.  Such written opinions may also shield the 
president from any Take Care challenges in court, giving him 
the ammunition to justify whatever actions his administration 
takes.58 
This power applies to the “principal Officer in each of the 
executive Departments,”59 meaning that the president must be 
able to seek opinions from all executive agencies, independent 
or otherwise.  Congress may not establish an agency and then 
rely on Professors Sunstein and Lessig’s “radical reading” of the 
Opinions Clause to suggest that the agency is headed by a head 
of department rather than a principal Officer and, therefore, is 
insulated from the president’s authority under the Opinions 
Clause.60  This is too fine of a textual line to support an entire 
fourth branch of government, particularly when the rest of the 
Constitution so strongly suggests the three branches.61 
Instead, the Opinions Clause guarantees the president the 
absolute power to inform himself of law-enforcement’s inner-
workings.  The Clause vests a discretionary power, not a duty, 
and it is a great power for the president in executing an agenda.  
It arms the president with evidence, in writing, for political 
 
Recommendation Clause, 77 GEO. L.J. 2079, 2087 (1989) (stating “the 
President can remove those who produce faulty or injudicious opinions”). 
58.  See infra Part V(B)(2) (discussing the Clause’s negative implication 
for presidential power).  This Section considers the idea that we should not 
read the word opinion so strictly so as to exclude any factual information or 
report.  The Clause is meant to provide the President with adequate advice and 
guarantee that he is responsible for all information in the executive branch.  
See infra notes 143–147 and accompanying text.  
59.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
60. See Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 17, at 35–38, 72, 113 (putting forth 
a radical reading of the Opinions Clause and the Inferior Officer’s Appointment 
Clause by stating that (1) the difference between the principal officer of the 
Opinions Clause and the heads of departments of the Inferior Officers 
Appointment Clause actually represents two different sets of people, and (2) 
the Opinions Clause only extends to the principal officer, thus creating a 
“fourth branch” under the heads of departments that is outside the president’s 
power, or at least outside the Opinions Power). 
61.  As this article will expand upon in Part B, the Clause applies to all 
principal officers, but not all inferior officers.  See infra notes 69–75 and 
accompanying text.  Congress could limit the President’s ability to demand 
reports from an inferior officer.  See infra notes 280–83 and accompanying text; 
contra Amar, supra note 10, at 667. 
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fights with congress, litigation in the Judiciary, and policy fights 
within the executive branch.62  As discussed in the next section, 
the Clause implies limitations on presidential power.  But even 
with these limitations, the Opinions Clause is an undeniable 
unitary executive power. 
 
B. The Opinions Clause and its Undeniable Limitation on  
Executive Power 
 
While the Opinions Clause undeniably vests the president 
with the discretionary power defined above, it also presents 
several implied negatives on the president’s constitutional 
powers, particularly in relation to congress’s ability to regulate 
the executive branch.  In other words, the Opinions Clause is 
significant not only for what it says, but also for what it does not 
say. 
First, the Opinions Clause vests the president with an 
absolute power to require principal officers report to him, but, 
by implication, this grant does not give the president the 
absolute power to issue directives and orders to those officers.  
Thus, congress can limit or restrict the president’s authority to 
direct a principal officer to take a specific action.  The same 
reasoning applies to the second negative implication: by 
granting the president the opinions power over the principal 
officer, the Opinions Clause denies the president the absolute 
authority to require opinions from inferior officers.  To be clear, 
the first implication allows congress to limit the president’s 
authority to issue orders to officers, while the second implication 
contemplates a limitation on the president’s authority to require 
opinions from inferior officers.  Finally, the Opinions Clause 
negates any broader readings of the president’s absolute powers 
over the day-to-day administration under the Vesting Clause, 
the Take Care Clause, or even the Appointments Clause.  One 
important example of a power that is not absolutely vested in 
the president is the removal power, which has long been justified 




62.  See infra Part IV(B).  
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1. Requiring Opinions “From” Does Not Include Issuing   
Orders “To” 
 
By granting the president the absolute power to require 
opinions from principal officers, the Opinions Clause implies 
that the president does not have an absolute power to order 
those same officers take specific actions.  As stated above,63 the 
Opinions Clause prohibits congress from interfering with the 
president’s power to receive and require reports from his 
principal officers on any subject related to the duties of the 
executive branch.  But this absolute power to seek opinions does 
not encompass the power to issue directives.64  Of course, this is 
not to say that all executive orders heretofore have been 
unconstitutional.  On the contrary, insofar as congress has 
delegated authority over a statutory scheme to the executive 
branch, the president derives a default authority to issue such 
directives both from the statutory delegation and from his duty 
under the Take Care Clause.65  However, as explained below in 
Section Four, the Take Care Clause is a passive-voiced duty to 
follow the law, and thus this authority can be regulated by 
 
63.  See supra notes 49–60 and accompanying text. 
64.  It is also worth rebutting some other possible negative implications 
of the Clause.  As explained above, a strict reading of the word opinion to 
exclude reports or facts does not make sense, particularly given the history of 
the Clause.  This is not to deny the originalist argument, which states that the 
Clause serves a historical purpose by alleviating contemporary fears that the 
newly-created President would go without advice.  Surely, facts and reports 
fall into this category.  In fact, President Washington often informed Congress 
of reports and statements he had received from his officers in his letters urging 
legislative action.  See Letter from George Washington, U.S. President, to the 
U.S. Senate & U.S. House of Representatives, (Aug. 7, 1789), http://founders. 
archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-03-02-0236 (“I have, therefore, 
directed the several statements and papers, which have been submitted to me 
on this subject by General Knox to be laid before you”). Additionally, Professor 
Amar contemplated in Some Opinions on the Opinion Clause, that the phrase 
in writing might suggest Congress could restrict in-person briefings, requiring 
that all executive communications be in writing.  See generally Amar, supra 
note 10 (emphasis added).  However, an opinion in writing, with all of the 
accountability placed on the officer, is surely a greater power than one-on-one 
or cabinet meeting conversations.  Thus, a greater includes the lesser theory 
suggests verbal communications are covered by this Clause.  
65.  Importantly, this reading of the Opinions Clause applies exclusively 
to the civilian, non-military government.  The President has a clear directive 
power over the national defense, and possibly even generic intelligence or 
national security through the Commander-in-Chief Clause. 
21
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congress.66  If congress feels the need to insulate a particular 
executive department from political pressure, it can restrict the 
president’s ability to order that department to take specific 
actions.67 
This first negative implication is further supported by 
comparing the Opinions Clause to the Commander-in-Chief 
Clause.  The Commander-in-Chief Clause undoubtedly vests the 
president with a directive power over military and national 
security officers, particularly in times of war.  The Clause also 
overlaps with the Opinions Clause, in that “principal Officers” 
certainly include the Secretary of Defense.68  But the comparison 
illustrates the substantive difference between the two clauses 
with respect to the civilian officers.  As Peter Strauss points out 
in A Softer Formalism, the Opinions Clause contemplates that 
there will be officers who have duties delegated to them.69  Thus, 
even though the Opinions Power is itself an active and 
discretionary power, it establishes a relationship with the 
civilian officers that is far more passive than the relationship 
established under the Commander-in-Chief Clause.  For the 
military, the president’s orders are the officer’s duties.  By 
contrast, for the civilian administration, the officer’s duties are 
defined by congress, and then subsequently reported to the 
president.  These roles are mirror images of each other, 
illustrating that for the civilian government, the principal officer 
is actually the active executive official and the president an 
overseer. 
 
2. The Principal Does Not Include the Inferior 
 
Second, the Opinions Clause vests the president’s authority 
 
66.  See infra text accompanying notes 77–82. 
67.  Because of this default deference to the president, congress should 
follow a clear statement rule if they choose to regulate the president’s ability 
to issue these orders. 
68.  The original proposal of the Opinions Clause put forth by Gouverneur 
Morris and Charles Pinckney at the convention listed the individual members 
of the cabinet, and it included the Secretaries of War and Foreign Affairs.  This 
portion of the clause was scrapped, leaving it up to Congress to structure the 
executive branch how it saw fit.  2 MAX FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL 
CONVENTION OF 1787 342 (1911).   
69.  Strauss, supra note 32, at 59.  
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to seek opinions from all principal officers, but it does not extend 
to the inferior officers.  Now, some may argue that a greater-
includes-the-lesser argument applies here: the power to have a 
principal officer report to you is greater than the power to have 
inferior officers report to you, and thus the president has the 
latter because of the granting of the former.70  However, this 
argument should not apply here.  In this context, the power to 
require opinions from inferior officers would be a greater power 
than the authority over the principal officers.  This balance of 
powers rests on two assumptions:  (1) the inferior and civil 
officers are the persons actually executing the laws in individual 
matters, whereas the principal officers are more managerial, 
and (2) the president, by virtue of the office, imposes tremendous 
political weight in every interaction, particularly with 
subordinates within the executive branch.  Given these 
assumptions, the power to require inferior officers to report 
directly to the president risks allowing a president to use the 
political clout of the office to improperly influence the otherwise 
faithful execution of the law in a specific matter.  This risk is not 
as great when interacting with the managerial principal officer; 
thus, the power over inferior officers is in fact greater than the 
textually granted power over the cabinet. 
In fact, in the early days of our Nation, President 
Washington recognized the imposing presence of his office and 
its potential negative effects on proper governmental functions.  
President Washington and the First Senate discussed the proper 
process for both the shared Appointments and Treaty-Making 
powers.71  In these discussions, both branches acknowledged 
that the President’s presence in the Senate chambers could 
result in a chilling effect on the Senate’s deliberations.  They 
decided that President Washington would not be present for the 
debate on nominees, citing improper influence imposed by “his 
presence [on] the fullest and freest enquiry into the Character of 
 
70.  See Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. 441, 449 (1850), for an example of the 
Supreme Court applying a greater-includes-the-lesser logic to interpret 
constitutional power grants, where the Court held that Congress’s greater 
power to create the lower federal courts includes the lesser power to restrict 
their jurisdiction. 
71.  Conference with a Committee of the United States Senate, 8 August 
1789, NAT’L ARCHIVES: FOUNDERS ONLINE, http://founders.archives.gov/ 
documents/Washington/05-03-02-0239 (last visited Oct. 12, 2018). 
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the Person nominated.”72  Remarkably, President Washington 
showed great self-awareness of the political powers of his office 
and the potential it created for improperly influencing the 
Senate—a coequal branch with respect to the Appointments and 
Treaty-Making power.  Surely, a president could have an even 
greater impact on the inferior officers within the executive 
branch. 
More recently, the executive branch instituted guidelines 
aimed at guarding against this improper presidential influence 
on matters handled by inferior officers.  The post-Watergate 
Department of Justice (DOJ) issued memos restricting the 
White House from contacts with the civilian and inferior officers 
within the DOJ, a strong reaction to the constitutional moment 
of presidential overreach.  Beginning with the Carter 
administration, the Department of Justice issued a policy memo 
to insulate attorneys and investigative officers from presidential 
or White House inquiry, reflecting the notion that such inquiries 
could improperly influence individual investigations.73  Instead, 
these memos established a process for presidential inquiry: the 
White House Counsel must submit the inquiry to the Attorney 
General, who then screens out such inquiries that may be 
improper from reaching the lower inferior or civil officer 
pursuing the case.74 
This process mirrors the principal-versus-inferior negative 
implication in the Opinions Clause.  Although the Opinions 
Clause vests the president with absolute power to require 
principal officers report to him “upon any Subject relating to the 
Duties of the respective Offices,” the Clause does not mention 
inferior officers,75 implying that the president does not have the 
same absolute power over them.  Here, the DOJ policies reflect 
this hierarchy.  The president maintains his constitutional right 
 
72.  Id. 
73.  Griffin B. Bell, U.S. Attorney Gen., Address at the Great Hall Before 
Department of Justice Lawyers 7–8 (September 6, 1978) (transcript available 
at https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ag/legacy/2011/08/23/09-06-1978b 
.pdf); Memorandum from Eric Holder, U.S. Attorney Gen., to Heads of Dep’t 
Components: All U.S. Attorneys (May 11, 2009), https://lawfare.s3-us-west-
2.amazonaws.com/staging/2017/2009%20Eric%20Holder%20memo.pdf 
(referencing a memo by 2007 Attorney General Michael Mukasey).  
74.  Bell, supra note 73, at 7–8. 
75.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
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to inquire or communicate with the principal officer, in this case 
the Attorney General.  However, the Attorney General can then 
screen these communications from reaching the inferior officers 
within the DOJ.  This process enables the Attorney General to 
maintain the political independence in law enforcement, a 
benefit to this reading of the Opinions Clause. 
Part V will expand on the DOJ policy, but it is used as an 
example here to preempt the argument that the principal officer 
inherently encompasses direct reporting from the inferior 
officer.  Thus, the negative implication stands: by limiting the 
textual grant of power to the president to principal officers, the 
Clause implies that the president does not have unlimited 
constitutional authority to reach into the executive departments 
for one-on-one interactions with the inferior officers.  As one 
example of the practical significance of this limitation on the 
Opinions Power, Article II and the Opinions Clause would not 
bar Congress from codifying the Holder Memo into law, should 
it wish to.  Of course, Congress is not authorized to pass such a 
law under Article II, but rather would need an Article I, Section 
8 justification for the law.  It should not be controversial, insofar 
as Congress has the power to create the Department of Justice 
to enforce the laws passed by Congress; it is necessary and 
proper to ensure those laws are enforced independently and not 
corruptly.76 
 
3. The Removal Power 
 
Relatedly, the Opinions Clause and Section Two as a whole 
negate reading an absolute removal power for the president.  To 
be clear, the first two executive power limitations are implied by 
the text of the Opinions Clause, whereas the negative 
implication on the president’s absolute removal power stems 
from the lack of a removal clause in Section Two.77  The framers 
 
76.  See Charles N. Steele & Jeffrey H. Bowman, The Constitutionality of 
Independent Regulatory Agencies Under the Necessary and Proper Clause: The 
Case of the Federal Election Commission, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 363, 367–68 (1987) 
(summarizing Buckley v. Valeo as recognizing the need for Congress to insulate 
the FEC from the President due in large part to the FEC’s “sensitive role in 
the oversight and possible prosecution of political candidates”). 
77.  Again, as with the power to issue directives, the default rule derived 
from both the statutory delegation and the Take Care Clause is that the 
25
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granted the president the limited Opinions Clause power, but 
they did not grant the president an absolute removal power 
through a Removal Clause.  In fact, the original proposal for the 
Opinions Clause at the convention made the Cabinet serve “at 
the pleasure of the president,”78 but the framers removed this 
phrase when they drafted the final Opinions Clause.79  Thus, not 
only is there no Removal Clause, but we also know the framers 
considered and rejected including such a phrase within the 
Opinions Clause, signifying that the text of Section Two should 
be read as denying the president an absolute removal power. 
Vesting the president with an unlimited and unenumerated 
removal power renders the limited Opinions Clause 
redundant.80  To illustrate, the textually granted Opinions 
Power versus the textual removal power evokes the inverse of 
the constitutional theory discussed above: the lesser power 
excludes the greater power.81  One would assume that the power 
to remove an officer for any reason would include the power to 
require that officer report to the president.  On the other hand, 
the power to require an officer’s opinion does not include the 
power to then fire that officer, particularly if the opinion reflects 
a faithful execution of the law.82  Because no other power listed 
in Article II, Section Two grants the removal power, the only 
argument for the power rests on the unitary scholars’ reading of 
the Vesting Clause, which will now be analyzed and refuted. 
 
4. The Rebuttal of the Unitary Scholars’ Argument 
 
Unitary scholars insist that either the Vesting Clause or the 
 
President can remove any officer.  See supra notes 64–66 and accompanying 
text.  Here, Congress needs to meet the clear statement rule by including 
phrases, such as for good cause only.  Id. 
78.  FARRAND , supra note 68, at 342.  At the “pleasure” of the President 
signifies that the President could remove the officials as he pleases. 
79.  See infra Part IV(A) notes 102–24 and accompanying text for a more 
detailed discussion of the debate at the Convention; see also supra note 41 for 
more on this revision. 
80.  See A. Michael Froomkin, Note, In Defense of Administrative Agency 
Autonomy, 96 YALE L.J. 787, 800 (1987). 
81.  See supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
82.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (assigning to the president a duty to “take Care 
that the Laws be faithfully executed”). 
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Take Care Clause grant the president the powers excluded by 
the limited Opinions Clause.  For instance, if the Vesting Clause 
actually grants the president with a textually unlimited 
executive power, then surely the president has the absolute 
power to issue directives, require opinions from the inferior 
officers, and remove at-will any executive branch official.83  As 
explained above, this reading requires accepting the Opinions 
Clause as redundant.  However, the text and structure of Article 
II negate this broad and textually unlimited reading of executive 
power.  This Section considers and rejects any arguments that 
other clauses override the three limitations of the Opinions 
Clause, and then consider and reject the unitary scholars’ 
argument that the three Vesting Clauses84 all serve as 
substantive power grants. 
Before refuting the Take Care Clause and the Vesting 
Clause arguments, consider that the Opinions Clause is the only 
textually granted power vested in the president encompassing 
the day-to-day administration of the executive branch.  That is, 
it is the only clause in Section Two, the powers section, that 
enumerates the president’s power in the general administration 
of the Government.85  Presumably, the Nominations Power (with 
the full Appointment Power shared with the senate), indicates 
at least partial presidential authority over the selection of 
personnel.86  Although it implies that the president will select 
officers who agree with his views on law execution, it does not 
directly speak to nor give the president authority to ensure those 
officers follow his views in their subsequent tenures.  In other 
words, the Opinions Clause applies to the appointed officials 
once they are confirmed and sworn-in. 
Outside of the Powers Section, unitary scholars would point 
to the Take Care Clause as requiring the president have the 
 
83.  See generally Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 16. 
84.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, cl. 1; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1; U.S. CONST. 
art. III, § 1, cl. 1; see generally supra note 21. 
85.  This generally contrasts the Opinions Clause with the Pardon Clause 
or the Commander-in-Chief Clause.  The pardon power is specific to the 
criminal justice system and the Commander-in-Chief Clause is specific to the 
military.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.  By contrast, the Opinions Clause 
generally applies to the entire executive branch, including both the military 
and pardons.  Id.  
86.  See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 4. 
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power to circumvent any of the limitations implied in the 
Opinions Clause,87 but the Take Care Clause differs from the 
Opinions Clause in two key ways.  First, it is a duty, located in 
the Duties Section of Article II.  As Justice Scalia noted in 
Zivotofsky v. Kerry, the imbalance between the duty of the Take 
Care Clause and the power of the Necessary and Proper Clause 
tips the balance of power towards congress.88  Just as the 
Necessary and Proper Clause is a power, so too is the Opinions 
Clause.  It is a power located in Article II, Section Two,89 thus it 
bars congress from regulating how or if the president can 
“require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer.”90  
Second, not only is the Take Care Clause a duty unlike the power 
given by the Opinions Clause, it is written in the passive voice: 
“[the president] shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully 
executed.”91  Justice Scalia correctly identified how this passive 
voice suggested a power imbalance between the Take Care 
Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause.92  Likewise, the 
same imbalance exists between the passive Take Care Clause 
and the active Opinions Clause.  The Opinions Clause is an 
affirmative and discretionary power grant that cannot be 
regulated by congress.  By contrast, the Take Care Clause is a 
duty that can be regulated by congress.  Therefore, the argument 
for presidential power based on the absolute Opinions Clause 
beats an argument based on the regulable Take Care Clause.93 
 
87.  See Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 16 at 583, 621 (arguing that 
while it is a duty, the Take Care Clause confirms that the President has the 
executive power granted from the Vesting Clause). 
88.  135 S.Ct. 2076, 2125 (2015) (Scalia, J. dissenting) (stating “[i]t turns 
the Constitution upside-down to suggest that in areas of shared authority, it is 
the executive policy that preempts the law, rather than the other way around. 
Congress may make laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution the 
President’s powers, Art. I, § 8, cl. 18, but the President must ‘take Care’ that 
Congress’s legislation ‘be faithfully executed,’ Art. II, § 3”) (emphasis in 
original). 
89.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.  
90.  Id.; McCulloch v. Maryland is another example of the Supreme 
Court’s reading a clause in light of its placement in the powers section. Chief 
Justice John Marshall rejects the state of Maryland’s narrow reading of the 
clause because it is placed in Article I Section 8 – the “powers” section for 
Congress.  17 U.S. 316, 419 (1819).  
91.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (emphasis added). 
92.  See Zivotofsky, 135 S.Ct. at 2125. 
93.  The Opinions Power cannot be regulated by Congress, unlike the 
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After the Take Care Clause, we are left with the most often 
debated clause, the Vesting Clause, as a potential grant of power 
in the negative spaces left by the Opinions Clause.  The three 
negative implications discussed in this section—the absolute 
power to issue orders, the absolute power to require opinions 
from inferior officers, and the absolute power to remove 
officers—would likely be covered by a substantive Vesting 
Clause.94  For instance, a president with an all-powerful 
executive power would surely be able to speak to or require the 
opinion of any officer, civil, inferior, principal, or otherwise, 
within the executive branch.  However, as summarized in Part 
II(A), supra, past scholars have aptly pointed out that the 
Opinions Clause by itself implies a non-substantive reading of 
the Vesting Clause.95  Most obviously, the Opinions Clause is a 
specific power and, as shown here, it is a limited power.  Not only 
would a substantive vesting clause render the Opinions Clause 
redundant, it would render it absurd.  Why include in Section 
Two an explicit and limited grant of power if some implicit and 
yet unlimited power contained in the Vesting Clause would 
 
Take Care duty.  See id. at 2116–26, (Scalia, J., dissenting).  As this debate 
centers on what Article II bars Congress from regulating, the Opinions Clause 
is a far stronger Clause. 
94.  Still, none of these powers are covered by the text.  Thus, even if you 
assume the Vesting Clause is a substantive grant of power beyond the 
enumerated powers, you still need to argue why a certain power is executive 
in nature.  Professors Calabresi and Prakash included the unrestricted 
constitutional right to remove all executive officials, to act in their stead, and 
to overrule any of their decisions.  See Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 16, at 
595.  It is assumed, for the purposes of this article, that they and other classic 
Unitary Executive scholars would argue that all of the negative implications 
of the Opinions Clause would be covered by the Vesting Clause.  This would be 
a safe assumption because Professors Calabresi and Prakash argued that the 
Opinions Clause itself was likely redundant.  Still, the executive power is open 
to debate, and because it is so divorced from the text, it can be used to justify 
a quasi-suspensions power, suspending Habeas Corpus, and even torture.  See 
Memorandum from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Att. Gen., U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, to William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Def. (Mar. 14, 2003) 
(on file with the Fed’n of Am. Sci.). 
95.  See supra Part II(A).  Again, the structural argument is important 
here; the Vesting Clause is in the “naming” section, or Section One.  U.S. 
CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.  Every other clause in that section describes the office 
of the presidency while not vesting any substantive powers.  Reading the 
Vesting Clause as a substantive power grant decontextualizes the Clause from 
its surroundings.  The Opinions Clause, by contrast, is a specified power right 
in the opening of Section Two, the Powers Section. 
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render nugatory the limits of the expressly delegated power?96 
Furthermore, this redundancy reading97 contravenes the 
constitutional maxim that, where powers are listed and others 
are excluded, the exclusion is meaningful.  This constitutional 
expressio unius canon dates back to Marbury v. Madison, 
wherein the Court rejected its power to issue a mandamus to 
certain officers because it was not enumerated in Article III’s 
original jurisdiction.98  Chief Justice Marshall wrote that 
“[a]ffirmative words are often, in their operation, negative of 
other objects than those affirmed; and . . . a negative or exclusive 
sense must be given to them or they have no operation at all.”99  
Marshall also cautioned that “it cannot be presumed that any 
clause in the constitution is intended to be without effect; and 
therefore such construction is inadmissible, unless the words 
require it.”100  In this case, the unitary reading of the Vesting 
Clause denies the Opinions Clause its exclusive sense, leaving it 
with no operation at all. 
Luckily, there is a more natural reading of Article II.  The 
Vesting Clause is in the naming section,101 establishing the office 
of the Presidency vested with the powers listed in Section Two, 
home of the Opinions Clause.  The unitary scholars’ theory 
requires us to decontextualize these two clauses: the Vesting 
Clause as a power grant in the naming section and the Opinions 
Clause as a descriptive redundancy in the powers section.  If one 
removes the Vesting Clause from Article II, Section One and 
then reads through the remaining clauses that name the 
 
96.  While, in practice, citing Vesting Clause authority may be how 
presidents exercise an opinions-like power, that does not mean that we should 
take a president’s word for it because any branch given blanket authority will 
aggrandize power.  
97.  See supra notes 33–43 and accompanying text. 
98.  5 U.S. 137, 174–75 (1803). 
99.  Id. at 174. 
100.  Id. 
101. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.  Article Two Section One’s other clauses 
establish the term of office, the vice president, the mode and date of election, 
citizenship and age requirements, compensation and emoluments, and finally 
the Oath of Office.  Id.  None of these clauses vest any substantive powers in 
the president; instead, they describe the office.  Id.  The Vesting Clause also 
describes the office, stating that it will be held by one person.  Id.  To make it 
clearer, the Removal Clause, since amended by the Twenty Fifth Amendment, 
refers to the power and duties of the office, a phrase that maps nicely onto the 
powers and duties sections.  Id. 
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characteristics of the office, one does not expect the next clause 
to vest any substantive powers.  Rather, the next clause logically 
should name another characteristic of the office.  In this case, 
that characteristic is that we have one president.  By contrast, 
reading Section Two’s other clauses, one is not expecting to see 
a clause merely describing the office of the Presidency.  Instead, 
one is looking for the next power to be vested in the president.  
Here, that power is the Opinions Clause. 
In sum, the text of the Opinions Clause vests the president 
with a discretionary, but limited, power.  It implies that the 
president does not have absolute powers to remove officials, 
issue directives, or reach into the executive departments and 
demand reports from the inferior officers.  Through these 
limitations, it rebuts the unitary scholars’ theory that the 
Vesting Clause or Article II in general grant the president with 
plenary but textually unlimited executive powers.  A substantive 
Opinions Clause and a non-substantive Vesting Clause is the far 
more natural reading of Article II’s text, and it matches the 
history of the Opinions Clause at the convention and the 
framers’ republican intent for the executive power. 
 
IV. The Original Opinions Clause: The Framers 
 and Their Republican Intent 
 
The textual argument set forth in Part III is supported by 
the history and the intent of the Constitution, particularly in the 
framing of the Presidency.  In the past, unitary scholars have 
pointed to the Clause’s introduction at the Convention by 
Charles Pinckney and Gouverneur Morris, two framers strongly 
in favor of a unitary executive, as evidence in support of that 
theory.  But, in Part A, the history of the proposal is reexamined, 
showing that the significant revisions made by the separate 
Committee of Eleven speak to the meaning of the actual clause 
the framers adopted.  Then, Part B recounts the republican 
intent of the presidency, namely that the executive power serves 
as a sufficient check on the legislature.  It is argued that the 
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A. Fitting the Opinions Clause in the Convention’s History  
 and Intent 
 
Throughout the convention, the debate over the executive 
power mirrored the debate scholars have to this day: what does 
it mean to have a unitary executive?  The Vesting Clause solves 
this debate to the extent that at least the executive powers 
defined in Article II would be vested in a single officer: the 
president.102  As other scholars have pointed out,103 the Opinions 
Clause was introduced near the end of the convention, 
representing the moment where it was finally settled that we 
would have one president in place of a council. 
There are two key moments for interpreting the Opinions 
Clause on the basis of the framers’ original intent.  First, 
Gouverneur Morris and Charles Pinckney proposed an Opinions 
Clause that was much broader than the final version left in the 
Constitution.  From this proposal, we can safely assume that 
Morris and Pinckney thought it necessary to enumerate the 
Opinions Power, suggesting that they did not believe such a 
power was encompassed in the already-written Vesting Clause.  
Second, the Committee of Eleven revised the Clause and 
eliminated the broad provisions from the Morris and Pinckney 
proposal.  These revisions imply that the framers did not want 
to vest the president with the absolute powers and duties 
inherent in the original proposal.  Instead, they wanted to leave 
these questions open for us to decide through statutes. 
The proposal introduced by Gouverneur Morris and Charles 
Pinckney was a broad and detailed plan for the president’s 
powers over the executive branch.104  The proposal vested the 
 
102.  See infra Part I, notes 1 and 2 for Mason and Hamilton’s 
disagreements (explaining how the naming function actually serves the 
greatest historical significance).  The debate at the convention over executive 
power centered more on whether to have one executive or to have a council, 
and not whether that executive would have an unchecked removal power, for 
instance.  Thus, if we take their structure to mean that the powers are listed 
in Section Two, then we can read the Vesting Clause as solving the actual 
debate at the Convention by vesting those powers in the President, and not in 
a Council.  The President has the authority to require the opinions, in writing, 
of the principal officers; a council does not.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
103.  Prakash, supra note 13, at 1005. 
104.  FARRAND, supra note 68, at 342. 
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president with the power to “submit any matter to the discussion 
of the Council of State, and he may require the written opinions 
of any one or more of the members: But he shall in all cases 
exercise his own judgment, and either Conform to such opinions 
or not as he may think proper.”105  Additionally, the proposal 
stated each of the secretaries, with the exception of the Chief 
Justice, “shall be appointed by the President and hold his office 
during pleasure”106 while also including an impeachment clause 
for “neglect of duty, malversation, or corruption.”107 
The introduction of the Opinions Clause at the convention 
implies that its powers were not assumed in the Vesting Clause, 
which had already been written.  Professors Prakash and 
Calabresi argue to the contrary: the two delegates behind the 
Opinions Clause proposal, Gouverneur Morris and Charles 
Pinckney, were pro-unitary executive, supposedly undermining 
the Clause’s implied restrictions on executive power.108  
However, that pro-unitary executive framers introduced this 
Clause suggests they felt the need to explain the executive 
framework they envisioned; a particularly significant suggestion 
considering the opposing viewpoints at the Convention.  
Pinckney and Morris weren’t the only framers.  Although they 
were strongly in favor of a unitary executive, others, like George 
Mason, were strongly opposed to one president.109  Though they 
favored the Virginia Plan that envisioned a president with great 
unitary powers, others favored the New Jersey Plan for a plural 
executive.110  Of course, those in favor of a unitary executive won 
out in the end,111 but it is important to remember these disputes 
when determining the extent to which they won.  Given that the 
Vesting Clause establishing a singular president had already 
 
105.  Id. at 343–44.  The “Council of State” included the Secretaries of 
Domestic Affairs, Commerce, Foreign Affairs, War and the Chief Justice.  Id. 
106.  Id. at 342.  In some sense, this also serves to rebut Sunstein and 
Lessig’s argument that the removal of the chief justice from this Clause and 
the subsequent lack of authority over the chief justice carries any weight.  The 
chief justice was recognized even in the original proposal as a separate and 
distinct figure.  See Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 17, at 33–34. 
107.  FARRAND, supra note 68, at 343–44. 
108.  Id. at 630–31; see also supra notes 37–41 and accompanying text.  
109.  THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS, supra note 1, at 23. 
110.  Id. at 39. 
111.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1. 
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been written at the time, Morris and Pinckney’s proposal could 
be read as these unitary framers’ next big play to define what 
powers a singular president would have.112  Under their 
proposal, the president would have complete powers over a 
constitutionally-created cabinet.  Though perhaps Morris and 
Pinckney believed such powers were inherent in the executive 
power in the Vesting Clause, at the very least, they thought it 
ambiguous enough to submit this proposal in the Convention’s 
final month.113 
Furthermore, Morris and Pinckney’s views do not explain 
the motives behind the revision and the ultimate clause that we 
have today.  The Opinions Clause is the result of revisions by the 
Committee of Eleven, of which Gouverneur Morris, but not 
Charles Pinckney, was a member.114  To illustrate the varied 
opinions on the Committee, Hugh Williamson, another member, 
stated that he strongly opposed “Unity in the Executive” and 
instead wished the power would be “lodged in three men taken 
from three districts into which the States would be divided.”115  
Another member, Roger Sherman, was on the record as 
preferring an executive branch that was “nothing more than an 
institution for carrying the will of the Legislature into effect, 
 
112. The Opinions Clause proposal was met with George Mason’s last-
ditch effort for a plural executive, suggesting that even this fight was not over 
with.  Prakash, supra note 13, at 1005–06.  The Convention rejected Mason’s 
proposal, and then revised the Opinions Clause.  Id.  Still, one must weigh the 
opposing viewpoints to a strong unitary executive in deciphering exactly what 
unitary powers the framers vested in the President. 
113.  The proposal was submitted in August, and the Convention 
adjourned in September.  NOAH FELDMAN, THE THREE LIVES OF JAMES MADISON 
167–70 (1st ed. 2017).  As has been documented, the framers in favor of the 
Constitution were anxious to break from the Convention and get to the 
ratification fights.  Id.  Any additional proposals at the end of the Convention 
could have risked losing the emerging consensus, thereby threatening the 
Constitution altogether.  That such a proposal be made at this time suggests 
that the sponsors thought it very important.  On September 13th, Madison 
made a reasonable suggestion that the other framers voted down in a lopsided 
vote, as they were “in no mood for a hairsplitting debate.”  Id. at 166.  Randolph 
moved for a new convention, which was rejected unanimously.  Id. at 168. 
114.  Committees at the Constitutional Convention, U.S.    
CONSTITUTION.NET (Jan. 24, 2010), https://www.usconstitution.net/constcmte 
.html (listing the Third Committee of Eleven for August 31st). 
115.  JONATHAN ELLIOT, 5 DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTION IN THE CONVENTION HELD AT PHILADELPHIA IN 1787, at 358 
(1845). 
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that the person or persons ought to be appointed by and 
accountable to the Legislature only.”116  We have no explanation 
for what motivated their revisions, and thus are only left to 
speculate based on the final text of the Constitution.  Textually, 
the Committee of Eleven’s revisions are more important than 
the original proposal because, not only were the revisions quite 
significant, but they also represent the most proximate debate 
on the true meaning of the Opinions Clause and its impact on 
the rest of Article II.  The Committee of Eleven’s revisions are 
the text that was adopted and ratified, and so we turn to them 
now. 
Although it is acknowledged that parts of the original 
proposal, particularly the at the pleasure service and the 
Presidential Discretion Clause suggest a broader power for the 
president, these broader presidential power provisions are what 
the Committee of Eleven ultimately struck.  The Committee of 
Eleven eliminated the president’s authority over the chief 
justice, the at the pleasure of the President service of the cabinet, 
and that the president must act on his own judgment.117  First, 
the Committee of Eleven’s decision to strike the Chief Justice 
from the president’s authority likely reflected a hesitancy with 
blending the two separate branches of government.  Professors 
Sunstein and Lessig, on the other hand, cite the removal of the 
chief justice from the president’s authority as evidence that the 
Opinions Clause is a necessary power grant.118  Because we 
acknowledge the president does not have the authority to 
require the opinion from the chief justice, they argue we can 
infer the president does not have any other powers that are not 
otherwise expressly granted.119  In other words, because the 
 
116.  Id. at 140. 
117.  Compare FARRAND, supra note 68, at 342–44 with U.S. CONST. art. 
II, § 2, cl. 1.  The “shall in all cases exercise his own judgment and either 
conform to such opinions or not as he may think proper” could read as imposing 
a duty on the president to always analyze the opinions given by the officer.  See 
FARRAND, supra note 68 at 342.  By striking this language, it is possible the 
framers wanted to ensure the president had the freedom to defer to the 
principal officer’s opinion without having to do legwork on every question.  
However, the proposal still enabled the president to conform to the opinions 
when proper.  Also, the duty to exercise individual judgment is likely imposed 
on the president by the Take Care Clause. 
118.  See Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 17, at 33–34. 
119.  Id. 
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Committee of Eleven removed both the chief justice and the at-
will clauses, we can analogize the president’s lack of authority 
over the chief justice to his arguable lack of authority to remove 
officers at will.120  Professors Calabresi and Prakash rebut this 
argument by stating that these are two separate and coequal 
branches of government, and thus we need a clear statement in 
the Constitution to enable the president to have authority over 
the chief justice.121  By contrast, they argue we do not need it 
spelled out that the president has such authority over 
subordinate officers within the executive branch.122 
Professors Calabresi and Prakash are correct insofar as the 
removal of the Chief Justice from the Opinions Clause does not 
affect the executive power under Article II, but instead 
exemplifies the framers’ recommitment to the Separation of 
Powers.  Rather than focus on that revision, we should focus on 
the key revision shedding light on executive power: the removal 
of the at the pleasure of language.  This revision shows that the 
framers considered vesting the president with an absolute power 
to remove Cabinet officials, but instead decided that this issue 
should not be resolved by the Constitution for all officials.  Thus, 
congress, assuming it has the power to pass a law under the 
Necessary and Proper Clause,123 can regulate the president’s 
removal authority.  Under the Take Care Clause, the president 
must faithfully abide by that law. 
Of course, one could argue that the elimination of the at the 
pleasure of the President language implies that the framers 
thought this was redundant given the Vesting Clause.  However,  
this redundancy argument is undercut by what they left: if they 
truly thought stating presidential ability to remove the officers 
at will was redundant, then why did they leave the ability to 
require the opinion in writing from these same officers?  Surely, 
an all-powerful executive power that includes the plenary 
removal power also includes the ability to ask those fired-any-
day-now officers’ opinions.  In other words, the proposal and its 
revision undermine the substantive Vesting Clause argument.  
Why strike the at the pleasure of the President language while 
 
120.  Id. 
121.  Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 16, at 627. 
122.  Id. 
123.  See Steele & Bowman, supra note 76. 
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leaving in the current Opinions Clause?  Of all the phrases in 
Gouverneur Morris and Charles Pinckney’s original proposal, 
the Opinions Clause as revised and ratified seems like the 
weakest presidential power, and, therefore, the strangest truism 
to restate. 
This history indicates that the framers and the Committee 
of Eleven intended to leave to future congresses the issue of the 
president’s power to remove officers, and, by extension, to issue 
directives.124  To further illustrate, the Committee of Eleven 
removed the specified Secretaries from the original proposal, 
leaving us with the principal officers.  In effect, this decision 
avoided having a constitutionally-created cabinet, and instead 
left it up to congress to structure the executive branch through 
laws, which congress has continuously done throughout our 
history without any claim that it is intruding on the executive 
power.125  Similarly, they did not want to settle the question of 
at-will removal, preferring to leave the question up to congress.  
By analogy to congress’ subsequent structuring of the executive 
departments, congress can also regulate the president’s ability   
to remove the officers.126  In other words, the Committee of      
Eleven balked at a constitutionally-created cabinet subject to 
absolute direction and removal by the president. 
 
B. The Republican Intent for the Presidency Served by the  
Opinions Clause 
 
Throughout the drafting and ratification process, James 
Madison and other framers made it clear that the Constitution 
aimed to guard against the tyranny of the majority.  In 
 
124.  The absolute removal power certainly includes the power to issue 
directives to officers. Therefore, both questions are left unsettled by the 
Committee of Eleven’s decision to remove the at the pleasure of the President 
language.  
125.  Note that Congress does not have an explicit power grant to 
structure the executive branch as it does in Article III.  Yet, it is still up to 
Congress to provide for the executive departments. Compare U.S. CONST. art. 
III, § I, with U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
126.  This is also a form of a greater-includes-the-lesser argument; the 
greater power to create and structure the executive branch through law implies 
the lesser power to define those officer’s status.  This same argument applies 
to Congress’ authority to create the lower federal courts; see generally U.S. 
CONST. art. III, § I. 
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Federalist No. 10, James Madison wrote that the greatest threat 
in a democracy was the threat of faction—interest groups and 
political parties that captured the legislature and gained 
unlimited political power to enact their policies.127  James 
Madison believed a strong national government would quell 
what he saw as a local problem.128  James Madison and the 
framers chose a unitary executive in part to have the energy and 
vigor to combat the majoritarian congress.129  The Pre-
Constitution state governments had taught them this key 
lesson.130  In the early days of American independence, anti-
aristocratic populists hungered for a responsive democracy 
represented by a legislature, rather than a strong executive 
resembling the King they detested.131  Pennsylvania’s 1776 
Constitution is perhaps the best example of this first wave of 
state constitutions.  Pennsylvania had a plural executive council 
instead of a unitary governor, and the council had no veto power 
over the legislature.  As a result, the Pennsylvania legislature 
quickly wrote the executive branch effectively out of the 
constitutional framework by law.132  The council was left with 
dwindling authority over the law’s execution, no powers to 
 
127.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison). 
128.  Id. (writing that one of the principles of a republic that can control 
faction is the “greater number of citizens, and greater sphere of country, over 
which the [elected representatives] may be extended”). 
129.  MADISON DEBATES, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/debates 
_721.asp.  James Madison on July 21, 1787, responding to an objection to the 
sharing of the executive and the judiciary in the veto power, stated “[i]t was 
much more to be apprehended that notwithstanding this co-operation of the 
two departments, the Legislature would still be an overmatch for them. 
Experience in all the States had evinced a powerful tendency in the Legislature 
to absorb all power into its vortex.  This was the real source of danger to the 
American Constitutions; & [he] suggested the necessity of giving every 
defensive authority to the other departments that was consistent with 
republican principles.”  Id. 
130.  Id. 
131.  Robert F. Williams, Evolving State Legislative and Executive Power 
in the Founding Decade, 496 ANNALS OF AM. ACAD. OF POL. & SOC. SCI. 43, 45 
(1988). 
132.  See CHARLES C. THACH, JR., THE CREATION OF THE PRESIDENCY 1775-
1789: A STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 33 (Johns Hopkins Press 1923).  
Despite it being unconstitutional, the Pennsylvania legislature appointed 
officers outside the council to manage the treasury and even command the 
militia.  Both powers were vested in the executive council by the constitution, 
but the lack of a veto and a politically powerful executive rendered the question 
moot.  See id. 
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combat the legislature, and no single voice with which to speak 
to the people.133 
Runaway legislatures paved the way for the second wave of 
state constitutions: those based more on republican principles.134  
The key to these constitutions was the strengthening of the 
executive branch, equipping it with the tools necessary to protect 
itself from encroachment by the state legislatures.  New York’s 
Constitution created the strongest state executive as of that 
point.  The governor, with the help of a council, had the power to 
veto laws for either policy or constitutional reasons.  The 
governor also shared with his council the power to appoint 
officers and judges of the courts.135  As a result, New York’s 
governorship was a politically powerful office and, as many 
scholars have pointed out, the first state-level model for the 
federal Presidency.136 
Unsurprisingly, given the experience in the states, the 
framers feared an overly powerful legislature on the federal 
level.  In fact, Madison believed that the legislative power could 
result in tyranny equally dangerous to that of a king.  In 
Federalist No. 48, he wrote: 
 
The legislative department is everywhere 
extending the sphere of its activity, and drawing 
all power into its impetuous vortex. The founders 
of our republics have so much merit for the 
wisdom which they have displayed, that no task 
can be less pleasing than that of pointing out the 
errors into which they have fallen. A respect for 
truth, however, obliges us to remark, that they 
seem never for a moment to have turned their 
eyes from the danger to liberty from the 
overgrown and all-grasping prerogative of an [sic] 
hereditary magistrate, supported and fortified by 
 
133.  See Williams, supra note 131, at 45–46; see also THACH, supra note 
132, at 33–35 (discussing the executive council’s failing efforts to write letters 
to the legislature). 
134.  Williams, supra note 131, at 47. 
135.  Id. at 47–48, 51. 
136.  McConnell, supra note 21, at 4; see also THACH, supra note 132, at 
40–41. 
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an [sic] hereditary branch of the legislative 
authority. They seem never to have recollected the 
danger from legislative usurpations, which, by 
assembling all power in the same hands, must 
lead to the same tyranny as is threatened by 
executive usurpations.137 
 
In other words, James Madison recognized that state 
framers had been so opposed to the executive power that they 
failed to realize the authoritarian potential of the legislature. 
This fear of a runaway legislature is reflected in the 
structure and text of our government.  For instance, the framers 
created a bicameral legislature to lessen the potential influence 
of factions, varying the terms and the constituencies of the 
individual members of each body.138  They vested the president 
with veto power, a fundamental and necessary check on the 
legislature.  At various times throughout the Convention, they 
contemplated joining the president and the Judiciary in a dual-
branch Council of Revision to combat the congress.139  Already, 
we see that the framers had effectively addressed many of the 
concerns presented by the experience in Pennsylvania and the 
other early state constitutions.  Still, it’s not enough to have one 
president with the power to veto the laws passed by congress, 
particularly when congress can then override that veto with a 
two-thirds majority.  The concerns of the Pennsylvania 
executive’s lack of a singular voice and lack of authority over the 
law’s execution still required a further remedy. 
Similar to the Council of Revision, the original Opinions 
Clause proposal included the chief justice as part of the 
president’s Council of State, again suggesting that the framers 
were so worried about the all-powerful legislature that they 
considered breaking their separation of powers norm to protect 
 
137.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 48 (James Madison). 
138.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison).  “In republican 
government, the legislative authority necessarily predominates.  The remedy 
for this inconveniency is to divide the legislature into different branches and 
to render them, by different modes of election and different principles of action, 
as little connected with each other as the nature of their common functions and 
their common dependence on the society will admit.”  Id. 
139.  MADISON DEBATES, supra note 129 (referring to Madison’s 
comments). 
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the president and the Judiciary.140  Although we do not have 
evidence from the convention for the original reason that 
Gouverneur Morris and Charles Pinckney included the chief 
justice in the president’s Council of State, we can infer from the 
debates over the Council of Revision that they likely wanted to 
guard against the powerful legislature.  Gouverneur Morris 
previously supported connecting the president with the 
Judiciary in the exercise of the veto power in the form of a 
Council of Revision.141  In debating the Council of Revision, 
Nathaniel Gorham motioned to join the judges with the 
president; Oliver Ellsworth seconded the motion, stating that 
the “aid of the Judges will give more wisdom & firmness to the 
Executive.  They will possess a systematic and accurate 
knowledge of the Laws, which the Executive can not [sic] be 
expected always to possess.”142  Ellsworth’s concerns are the 
same as those addressed by the Opinions Clause: the president 
will need adequate information to check congress. 
The Opinions Clause, even read in its narrowest light, 
provides the president with the power to effectuate this 
republican check against the tyranny of the majority.  The 
unitary executive gives us an executive branch responsible to the 
entire country.  However, this accountability does not require 
the president be able to direct any or all of the law’s execution, 
nor does it require him to have the plenary power of removal.  
Instead, it requires the president to be able to speak to us, his 
voters, with a unitary voice.  With the Opinions Clause, the 
framers effectively guaranteed that the president would be in 
the unique constitutional position to be able to know everything 
in the executive branch on behalf of us.  No individual senator, 
congressperson, or even majority party in the Senate or House 
has this power.  In a conflict, they have to conduct messy 
investigations with majoritarian votes required to subpoena 
individuals and information.  Alternatively, they have to pass 
laws, getting bills out of committee with majority votes, through 
each house, and then through the Conference Committee to then 
present the law to the president to sign.  Then, of course, is the 
issue of speaking with one voice—even should the Senate or 
 
140.  FARRAND, supra note 68, at 342–43. 
141.  Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 16, at 633. 
142.  THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS, supra note 1, at 107. 
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House gain access to the key information, they will first need to 
reach at the very least a majoritarian consensus on how to read 
and communicate that information to us.143 
By contrast, the president may require reports on any 
subject within the executive branch—there is nothing of note 
within the executive branch that the president cannot effectively 
investigate.  In Pennsylvania, the state legislature could 
completely usurp the executive power from the council and cut 
them out of the loop.  In effect, this left the council without the 
power to obtain opinions from these non-executive officers, and 
thus they could not adequately defend themselves to the 
people.144  For the president, the indefeasible power ensured by 
the Opinions Clause grants the ability to provide the check that 
was absent in Pennsylvania.  Herein lies true republican 
constitutional accountability: the president, elected by the entire 
nation, can demand the report from the principal officer 
overseeing any facet of the law’s execution.  Then, if the 
 
143.  A recent example illustrates the disadvantage Congress faces as 
opposed to the Opinions Power: the Republican majority in the House 
Intelligence Committee released a memo discrediting the FBI’s Russia-related 
investigation into American citizens.  However, political pressure then forced 
a vote to release the Democratic minority memo that directly refuted the 
Republicans’ claims.  Compare Memorandum from the U.S. House Permanent 
Select Comm. on Intelligence Majority Staff to the U.S. House Permanent 
Select Comm. on Intelligence Majority Members (Jan. 18, 2018) (on file with 
the U.S. House of Representatives), with Memorandum from the U.S. House 
Permanent Select Comm. On Intelligence Minority to the House of 
Representatives (Jan. 29, 2018) (on file with the U.S. House of 
Representatives).  No such dissent exists for the President, who has the unitary 
authority to speak with an opinion in hand.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.  
144.  See generally THE FEDERALIST NO. 48 (James Madison); THACH, 
supra note 132.  The Pennsylvania executive council complained to the 
legislature that the laws passed, such as vesting defense of the Delaware River 
in a non-executive officer, violated the Constitution.  Presumably, the 
executive council did not possess the authority to require reports from that 
non-executive officer.  Id.  Interestingly, the Pennsylvania State Constitution 
vested an Opinions-like power in the Council of Censors, which was a quasi-
convention to be elected for a one-year term, every seven years, to review the 
Constitution.  Id.  The Clause stated: “[f]or these purposes they shall have 
power to send for persons, papers, and records; they shall have authority . . . 
to recommend to the legislature the repealing such laws as appear to them to 
have been enacted contrary to the principles of the constitution.”  PA. CONST. 
of 1776, § 47.  This is perhaps the earliest known precursor to the Opinions 
Clause, but it suggests that the power serves as a conational and republican 
check on legislative abuses. 
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president has the legal authority, he can direct a specific policy 
change or even remove a poorly performing officer.  However, 
even if the president is confined by law in such a way that pro-
unitary scholars fear, the president still has the ability to take 
these reports to congress or his voters and call on us to hold our 
congressperson’s or senator’s feet to the fire. 
In addition to the power to hold congress accountable, the 
Opinions Clause also demands accountability from the president 
as it denies him the ability to hide behind the Cabinet.  The 
Opinions Clause makes it clear: the president is responsible to 
the voters for all actions taken by the executive branch.145  In 
other words, if the executive branch fails in its duty and the 
president says he didn’t know about it, the voters can point to 
the clause and demand an explanation for the informational 
breakdown.  Even in situations where the president lacks the 
legal authority to take immediate corrective action, the vision of 
a republican check on congress outlined here demands that the 
president explain his lack of authority to us with the help of an 
opinion. 
For example, President Trump recently blamed the FBI for 
their failure to act on tips on the shooter at Marjorie Stoneman 
Douglas High School in Parkland, Florida.146  However, these 
situations are exactly the type that the Opinions Clause lays at 
the president’s feet.  President Trump, through the Opinions 
Clause, is responsible for all information within the executive 
branch, which certainly includes the FBI’s efforts to protect us 
from violent actors.  After prior shootings, the President could 
 
145.  In this sense, the Opinions Clause serves the accountability 
interests behind having a unitary executive.  See THE FEDERALIST NO. 70 
(Alexander Hamilton) (“But one of the weightiest objections to a plurality in 
the Executive, and which lies as much against the last as the first plan, is, that 
it tends to conceal faults and destroy responsibility. Responsibility is of two 
kinds to censure and to punishment . . . the multiplication of the Executive 
adds to the difficulty of detection in either case.”); see also Amar, supra note 
10, at 661; Prakash, supra note 13, at 1006–07. 




(stating “[v]ery sad that the FBI missed all of the many signals sent out by the 
Florida school shooter.  This is not acceptable.  They are spending too much 
time trying to prove Russian collusion with the Trump campaign – there is no 
collusion. Get back to the basics and make us all proud!”). 
43
ARTICLE 5_MURRAY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/28/2019  2:16 PM 
272 PACE LAW REVIEW Vol. 39.1 
have required the “Opinion, in writing” from either the Attorney 
General or the FBI Director (provided that no law prevents such 
an inquiry to an inferior officer) about the FBI’s tips and 
reporting process or even demand a weekly summary of 
particularly noteworthy tips, undoubtedly a subject related to 
the duties of the Department of Justice and FBI.147  Given this 
authority, the President cannot hide behind the failings of 
individual officers on the ground without at least showing the 
steps taken to ensure such informational breakdowns do not 
occur.  The flow of information, including tips to the FBI, is 
expressly within the President’s discretion.  The Opinions 
Clause says so. 
In essence, this vision of accountability in the Constitution’s 
text can meet our republican needs while also avoiding the 
accretion of power in the executive branch.  Even James 
Madison, who so strongly supported a vigorous unitary executive 
at the convention, and even, much to the Unitary scholars’ 
delight, voted to vest the president with removal authority in the 
Decision of 1789, realized the unchecked potential of the 
executive he helped create.  In the Neutrality Proclamation and 
his losing effort in the fight over executive power with Alexander 
Hamilton, James Madison recognized that in his obsession over 
the potentially tyrannical legislature, he had created a singular 
branch of government that could, in fact, pose a great danger to 
the republic.148  In other words, James Madison had made the 
inverse of the error he attributed to the early state constitutions 
who empowered the legislature at the expense of the executive.   
Thankfully, both the Decision of 1789 and the Neutrality 
Proclamation are examples of post-Constitution policy debates, 
and we will always have the authority to course-correct through 
the law. 
 
V. The Functional Opinions Clause: President Washington 
and the Three Key Powers 
 
In the immediate aftermath of the Constitutional 
Convention, President Washington used the Opinions Clause to 
 
147.  See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
148.  See FELDMAN, supra note 3, at 375–84.  
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aid his efforts to cement the newly formed federal government.  
President Washington faced the nation’s first crisis in the 
Whiskey Rebellion and used the Opinions Clause to inform 
himself and the Congress of the measures that needed to be 
taken to quash the rebellion.  Part A recounts this story through 
the lens of the Opinions Clause, beginning with Washington’s 
reports on the need for a militia from Secretary of War Henry 
Knox to the opinions from Secretary of Treasury Alexander 
Hamilton and Attorney General Edmund Randolph on how to 
stop the crisis.  Each of the opinions recounted below served the 
president’s interests in congress, in the courts, and in popular 
opinion.  From this story, three key Opinions Clause powers are 
inferred for subsequent and future presidents.  These powers are 
outlined in Part B.  The first power is the Unitary Political Tool, 
which allows the president to use opinions from the cabinet to 
further political and legislative goals both in congress and with 
the American people.  The second power, the Unitary Judiciary 
Tool, enables the president to defend executive actions or take 
offensive actions in court.  Finally, the third power is the Unitary 
Executive Tool, which is a recognition that the Opinions Clause 
allows the president to unite the executive into a coherent, 
uniform and law-abiding branch. 
 
A. President George Washington, the Whiskey Rebellion,  
and the Complete Picture of the Opinions Clause 
 
At the founding of our republic, President George 
Washington understood the role and the powers of the 
Presidency provided by the Opinions Clause.  Before the First 
Congress designed the executive branch, Washington availed 
himself of the expertise of the acting department heads left over 
from the Continental Congress.149  As Professors Calabresi and 
Yoo highlight, President Washington consistently asked the first 
principal officers for written reports of their respective 
departments to acquaint himself of the country’s situation.150  
 
149.  STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY 
EXECUTIVE: PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH 40–41 (Yale 
Univ. Press 2008). 
150.  Id. (“A mere five days after Washington’s inauguration, he asked 
Acting Secretary of War Henry Knox to examine and provide a summary report 
45
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Gradually, these communications turned to asking the cabinet 
for their opinions on the policies and the constitutionality of 
proposed acts by Congress.151  President Washington’s 
correspondence with his Cabinet reveals a pattern of the 
presidency textually depicted in the Opinions Clause: the 
president requires the principal officers to report to him, and 
then, after careful consideration of their opinions, he takes the 
action authorized by law.  In particular, the Opinions Clause 
enabled each of President Washington’s actions in crushing the 
Whiskey Rebellion, a seminal moment establishing the strength 
and longevity of the newly-created federal government.152  Most 
importantly, each of these actions show that the Opinions Power  
provides the president with a unitary legislative and political 
tool, judicial tool, and executive tool as described in Part B 
below. 
The story of President Washington’s Opinions-enabled 
victory over the Whiskey Rebellion begins in 1789 with his effort 
to get Congress to legalize the militia under the new 
Constitution.  In this example, we see the Opinions Clause 
acting as a unitary legislative tool for the President, arming him 
with evidence and opinions that he uses to get his agenda 
 
on papers regarding a treaty with the Cherokee Indians that he was 
forwarding to Knox.  A little more than a month later, Washington asked the 
Board of the Treasury, the acting postmaster general, and the acting 
secretaries of war and foreign affairs to prepare a written report that would 
provide him with ‘an acquaintance with the real situation of the several great 
Departments’ and a ‘full, precise, and distinct general idea of the affairs of the 
United States’ connected with their particular departments.”) (footnote 
omitted) (emphasis in original); Letter from George Washington to the U.S. 
Senate and House of Representatives, supra note 64.  Washington went on to 
attach the report from Secretary Knox on the treaty with the Cherokee Indians 
in his letter to the Senate and the House of Representatives on August 7, 1789.  
Id.  Washington writes to Congress that he thinks it “proper to suggest the 
consideration of the expediency of instituting a temporary Commission for [the 
purpose of negotiating a treaty], to consist of three persons, whose authority 
should expire with the occasion.”  Id. 
151.  CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 149, at 41 (showing that Washington 
recognizes the link between the Opinions Power and the legislative role of the 
Presidency, particularly with respect to the Veto Power).  The President seeks 
the advice of his Cabinet on the constitutionality and policy considerations in 
acts of Congress, giving him ammunition to file his “Objections” should he 
decide to veto.  Id.; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7. 
152.  See generally Richard H. Kohn, The Washington Administration’s 
Decision to Crush the Whiskey Rebellion, 59 J. AM. HIST. 567 (1972). 
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through Congress.153  On August 10, 1789, President 
Washington directed a report to Congress on the status of the 
troops left over from the Continental Congress, adding his 
opinion on the continued importance of the troops to protecting 
the nation.154  Through this policy position, he urged Congress 
to legalize the militia under the new Constitution and to grant 
him a procedure for calling these troops into action.155 
Perhaps disheartened by Congress’s delay, President 
Washington sent Secretary of War Henry Knox a letter 
containing initial plans for a nationalized militia, and asked 
Secretary Knox to report back with a detailed proposal for 
Congress to consider.156  A month later, on January 18, 1790, 
Secretary Knox sent  President Washington his “plan for the 
arrangement of the militia of the United States,” along with his 
recommendation that the “events . . . require that the 
government should possess a strong corrective arm.”157  To be 
clear, this correspondence between President Washington and 
his principal officer is the incarnation of the text of the Opinions 
Clause.  President Washington required the opinion of Secretary 
Knox, who then fulfilled his duty to supply that opinion.158  Then, 
three days later, President Washington wrote to Congress with 
his own opinion that creating a national militia was “of the 
highest importance to the welfare of our Country,” and sent 
Congress the detailed plan devised by Secretary Knox for 
Congress to consider.159  Still frustrated, President Washington 
reminded Congress of these previous communications and the 
importance of the militia in his 1791 address to Congress.160  
 
153.  See infra Part V(B)(I).  
154.  Letter from George Washington, U.S. President to the U.S. Senate 
and House of Representatives (Aug. 10, 1789), https://founders.archives.gov/ 
documents/Washington/05-03-02-0251-0001#. 
155.  Id. 
156.  George Washington, Diary Entry (Dec. 19, 1789), http://founders. 
archives.gov/documents/Washington/01-05-02-0005-0004-0019.  
157.  Letter from Henry Knox, U.S. Secretary, Dep’t of War, to George 
Washington, U.S. President (Jan. 18, 1790), http://founders.archives.gov/ 
documents/Washington/05-05-02-0009. 
158.  Id. 
159.  Letter from George Washington, U.S. President, to the U.S. Senate 
& U.S. House of Representatives (Jan. 21, 1790), 
http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-05-02-0020. 
160.  See generally Letter from George Washington, U.S. President to the 
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Finally, on May 2, 1792, Congress gave President Washington 
what he wanted: the 1792 Militia Act vested President 
Washington with the emergency power to call the militia into 
action provided that Congress was on recess and that a federal 
judge certified that control of the situation was beyond the 
judiciary’s capabilities.161  Again, the Opinions Clause provided 
President Washington with the authority to inform himself, and 
then use that information as evidence to push his agenda 
through Congress—an early example of a president using Article 
II’s unitary legislative tool. 
As the Whiskey Rebellion heightened, President 
Washington utilized the Opinions Clause to collect diverse and 
at times contentious advice from his Cabinet and then formed a 
unitary executive policy that the administration acted on.162  On 
August 2, 1794, President Washington and his Cabinet met with 
officers from the state of Pennsylvania in an effort to inform 
them of the situation facing the federal government and to enlist 
their help in response.163  In this meeting, President Washington 
presented the Pennsylvanians with communications from 
officers on the ground in Western Pennsylvania to Secretary of 
Treasury Alexander Hamilton and Secretary Knox.164  These 
papers and this meeting support both a key potential power and 
an important reading of the Opinions Clause.  First, the 
President used the opinions and reports from the executive 
branch in an attempt to build political support.165  Although the 
Pennsylvania officials are not what we may think of as the 
People, the end goal is the same: President Washington wanted 
a politically palatable method to achieve his policy of quashing 
the rebellion and collecting the excise tax.  Second, these papers 
reinforce the hierarchy contemplated by the Opinions Clause, 
 
U.S. Senate and House of Representatives (Oct. 25, 1791), https://founders. 
archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-09-02-0062. 
161.  See Kohn, supra note 152, at 572; see also Act of May 2, 1792, ch. 28, 
1 Stat. 264, 264–65 (1792). 
162.  See infra Part V(B)(3). 
163.  See Conference Concerning the Insurrection in Western 
Pennsylvania, [2 August 1794], NAT’L ARCHIVES: FOUNDERS ONLINE, 
http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-17-02-0009 (last visited 
Oct. 25, 2018).  
164.  Id. at n. 3–8. 
165.  See infra Part I(B). 
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namely that a president need not reach into the inferior and civil 
officers in the individual departments, but instead can gather 
the information through the filter of his principal officers.166  
While there was no statute preventing President Washington 
from communicating directly with the officers who wrote to 
Secretaries Knox and Hamilton, if such a statute did exist, as is 
contemplated in the discussion below around President 
Trump,167 President Washington still would have been able to 
carry out his plan in this meeting. 
Unfortunately, President Washington, in the meeting with 
the Pennsylvania state officials, failed to garner enough political 
and actual support from the state government, thus leaving him 
to consider any and all options available to the federal 
government.168  Within a few days of the meeting, Secretary 
Hamilton reported to President Washington the entire factual 
history of the Whiskey Rebellion as it was known to the federal 
government.169  This detailed report reinforces the hierarchy 
contemplated by the Opinions Clause, as each of the factual 
assertions come from communications by the inferior officers to 
Secretary Hamilton.170  In a later letter, Secretary Hamilton 
wrote to Washington that it would be politically advantageous 
to release this detailed factual report to the citizens at large.171  
Two days later, President Washington submitted Secretary 
Hamilton’s factual report to Attorney General Edmund 
Randolph, seeking his opinion on the merits of releasing the 
 
166.  See infra  Part  III(B)(2)   (this  hierarchy  refers   to   the   negative  
implication analysis).  
167.  See infra Part VI(B). 
168.  See Kohn, supra note 152. 
169.  See Letter from Alexander Hamilton, U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, 
to George Washington, U.S. President (Aug. 5, 1794), http://founders.archives. 
gov/documents/Washington/05-16-02-0357. 
170.  Id. (“The reality of the danger to the Deputy was countenanced by 
the Opinion of General Neville, the Inspector of the Revenue, a man who before 
had given and since has given numerous proofs of a steady and firm temper.  
And what followed, as announced in a letter of that Officer of the 27th of 
October 1791, is a further Confirmation of it.” (footnote omitted)).  Hamilton’s 
opinion to Washington contains numerous references to correspondence from 
Inspector Neville, an inferior officer reporting to Hamilton.  Id. 
171.  Letter from Alexander Hamilton, U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, to 
George Washington, U.S. President (Aug. 16, 1794),  http://founders.archives. 
gov /documents/Washington/05-16-02-0387. 
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report to the people.172  Attorney General Randolph cautioned 
President Washington on the optics of naming names, and, 
remarkably, even suggested that Secretary Hamilton may be 
picking and choosing his targets based on personal rivalries.173  
Here, President Washington relied on two of the Opinions 
Clause’s powers outlined below in Part B.  He attempted to unify 
the executive branch’s message on the best way to respond to 
Pennsylvania’s intransigence and the Whiskey Rebellion, 
essentially cross-checking the Secretary of Treasury’s wishes 
with the opinion of the Attorney General.174  Additionally, 
President Washington quite amazingly used the Opinions 
Clause to solicit the advice from two of his principal officers 
about the merits of one of the Opinions Clause’s key uses: 
releasing an opinion to garner political support from the 
people.175  Secretary Hamilton was chomping at the bit to name 
and shame the rebels, while General Randolph suggested this 
may backfire politically.176  On this debate, President 
Washington leaned towards Attorney General Randolph, 
sending commissioners to the region to appear politically 
cautious while he also began to ready the militia.177 
President Washington also effectively utilized the Opinions 
Power as a tool for engaging in confrontations with the 
judiciary.178  In the days immediately following the meeting, 
President Washington asked his principal officers to “give, in 
[w]riting, their opinion on the measure[s] proper to be pursued 
by the [e]xecutive.”179  Secretary Knox, in response, reminded 
 
172.  See Letter from Edmund Randolph, U.S. Sec. of State, to George 
Washington, U.S. President (Aug. 18, 1794), 
http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-16-02-0395. 
173.  Id. (“The specifying of names in the third page, and the omission of 
all names, except Cannon and Gallatin . . . will be interpreted into a kind of 
warfare waged by the President against individuals in the former case, and a 
desire of selecting for odium Gallatin, whose hostility against the Secretary of 
the treasury is well known.”). 
174.  See infra Part V(B)(3) (Unitary Executive Tool). 
175.  See infra Part V(B)(1) (Unitary Political Tool). 
176.  See Kohn, supra note 152, at 574–75. 
177.  Id. 
178.  See infra Part V(B)(2) (Unitary Judicial Tool). 
179.  Letter from Henry Knox, U.S. Sec. of War, to George Washington, 
U.S. President (Aug. 4, 1794), http://founders.archives.gov/documents/ 
Washington/05-16-02-0354.  It should be noted that the request mirrors the 
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the President of the statutory test laid out in the Militia Act of 
1792: he had to convince a federal judge that restoring order to 
the region was beyond the “ordinary course of judicial 
proceedings.”180  Thus, Secretary Knox presented the evidence 
submitted to him by the inferior officers, particularly Thomas 
Butler and Isaac Craig, who described the lawless state of the 
area and the violence inflicted on the Inspector of the Revenue’s 
home.181  As a result of this communication from his inferior 
officers, Secretary Knox offered President Washington his 
opinion on the militia force that may be required, provided the 
President got the certification from the federal judge.182 
President Washington gathered this information laid out by 
his Cabinet and submitted it as evidence to Justice James 
Wilson, seeking the certification required by the Militia Act of 
1792.183  In response, Justice Wilson issued the order stating 
that the insurrection was too powerful “to be suppressed by the 
ordinary Course of judicial Proceedings, or by the Powers vested 
in the Marshal of that District.”184  More importantly for our 
purposes, Justice Wilson expressly based this decision on the 
“[e]vidence, which has been laid before me.”185  Here, President 
Washington effectively used the Opinions Power to produce 
evidence submitted to a court, and it was that evidence that 
allowed him to further his policy goal.  Additionally, this 
 
text of the Opinions Clause itself.  President Washington often mirrored the 
Constitution’s text in his letter without explicitly citing a particular clause.  
See also Letter from George Washington, U.S. President, to the U.S. Senate & 
U.S. House of Representatives (Jan. 8, 1790), https://founders.archives.gov/ 
documents/Washington/05-04-02-0361 (reporting what is “necessary to convey 
to you that information of the state of the Union, which it is my duty to afford”).  
It is inferred from President Washington’s use of the exact same language that 
he was citing the constitutional clause in question; in the case for this article, 
the Opinions Clause.  
180.  Letter from Henry Knox to George Washington, supra note 179.  
181.  Id. at n.3. 
182.  Id.  “[T]he Opinion is submitted that good consequences will arise 
from having even a super abundant force.  The interests of humanity and good 
order will be combined by preventing the deluded people from entertaining 
hopes of a successful resistance.  The power of the Government to execute the 
laws will be demonstrated both at home and abroad.”  Id. (explaining that Knox 
would also provide an accounting of militias and equipment of the 
Pennsylvania and the surrounding states).  
183.  Id. at n.4. 
184.  Id. 
185.  Id. 
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particular episode highlights that President Washington obeyed 
the law as it was passed by Congress.  He did not base his actions 
on a protective power or other non-textual executive power 
inherent in the Constitution.  The Congress placed a limit on the 
President’s authority over the militia, and he used the Opinions 
Clause to comply with it. 
In sum, President Washington achieved a great victory for 
his administration and for the early survival of the federal 
government through the intended use of the Opinions Clause.  
He convinced Congress to pass a law authorizing his use of the 
militia, arming himself with the opinion of the Secretary of War 
on the status and need for such a militia.  He united the 
executive branch, settling differences in opinion and ensuring 
that he acted only after having the best advice.  He then followed 
the congressional mandate in the Militia Act of 1792 and used 
the opinions as evidence to convince Justice Wilson to certify the 
need to call the militia into action. He even contemplated the 
political pros and cons of potentially releasing his Cabinet’s 
opinions to the American people.  Importantly, he did not need 
to reach into the executive departments and communicate 
directly with the inferior officers, instead he relied on the filter 
and the expertise of his principal Officers.  In the end, the 





186.  See Letter from George Washington, U.S. President, to the U.S. 
Senate & U.S. House of Representatives (Nov. 19, 1794, http://founders. 
archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-17-02-0125.  As mandated by law, 
President Washington reported his success to the next session of Congress in 
his State of the Union, and requested they authorize the continued presence of 
troops in the region.  Interestingly, President Washington did not rely on his 
executive power to unilaterally keep the militia in Western Pennsylvania. Id.  
Rather, he used the information provided to him by his Cabinet Secretaries to 
request Congress grant him a continuing authorization.  Id.  On the one hand, 
the Opinions Power armed President Washington with the evidence to 
convince Congress.  Id.  On the other hand, the limited reading of executive 
power allowed Congress to debate the merits of the standing militia, providing 
a check on the President’s agenda.  Id.  Just ten days after the President’s State 
of the Union, the Third Congress passed a continuing authorization statute for 
the militia in Western Pennsylvania, perfectly illustrating the strength of the 
Opinions Power for a politically skilled President.  Id.; see also Act of Nov. 29, 
1794, ch. 1, 1 Stat. 403, 403 (1794). 
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B. Don’t Fret: The Unitary Executive Powers Vested by the  
       Opinions Clause 
 
As detailed above, President Washington made extensive 
use of the power vested in him by the Opinions Clause, requiring 
his cabinet to report advice to him and then using that advice to 
take action on behalf of the country.187  From President 
Washington’s actions on the Whiskey Rebellion, there are three 
potential uses of the Opinions Clause: The Unitary Political 
Tool,188 The Unitary Judicial Tool,189 and The Unitary Executive 
Tool.190  This Section focuses on these three particular powers, 
expanding on both recent examples and potential uses.  Both the 
political and judicial tools cover the president’s relationship with 
the two other co-equal branches of government.  The Unitary 
Executive Tool represents the president’s unitary authority over 
the executive branch, with the Opinions Power enabling him to 
unite his agenda, exercise or support for-cause removals, and to 
force independent agencies to justify their actions.  Importantly, 
each of these potential powers vested in the president under the 
Opinions Clause is vested in the president alone, and thus this 
article will call them “unitary” powers. 
 
1. Unitary Political Tool 
 
As Professors Amar and Prakash have stated, the Opinions 
Clause vests the president with the unique authority vis-à-vis 
the other branches over information in the executive branch.191  
In this sense, the Clause establishes the president as a chief 
information officer, one who will never be denied advice or 
opinions.192  The president can use this advantage in political 
fights, both by taking such opinions or reports to the congress to 
push his legislative agenda, or, if congress fails to respond, 
taking the opinions to the people to vote the bums out. 
 
187.  See CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 149, at 40–41. 
188.  See infra Part V(B)(1).  
189.  See infra Part V(B)(2). 
190.  See infra Part V(B)(3). 
191.  See Amar, supra note 10, at 658–59; Prakash, supra note 13, at 1005. 
192.  But cf. Prakash, supra note 13, at 991–92 (describing the “Chief 
Administrator” theory). 
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The history of the proposal at the convention supports this 
vision of a president as a legislative leader.  The original 
proposal included the chief justice, who would “from time to time 
recommend such alterations of and additions to the laws of the 
U. S. [sic] as may in his opinion be necessary to the due 
administration of [j]ustice, and such as may promote useful 
learning and inculcate sound morality.”193  Quite obviously, the 
framers contemplated that the Opinions Clause would give the 
president the weaponry with which to engage in legislative 
fights.  As stated above, the framers so wanted the president to 
have this confidence that they nearly united the president and 
the chief justice, contravening the separation of powers norm.194  
By removing this passage from the final Opinions Clause, the 
Committee of Eleven appears to have made the judgment call 
that advisory opinions and the political involvement of the 
judiciary would outweigh the benefits given to the stronger 
Presidency.195  Still, they accomplished their original goal: the 
Opinions Clause vests the president with the power to utilize the 
vast scope of the executive branch to make his case to the 
congress or the people.  Several examples are provided below. 
Because this article also argues for the Opinions Clause’s 
negative implications for the executive power, it’s important to 
analyze the value of the Opinions Clause in situations where the 
president does not have unilateral or unrestricted authority.  To 
best illustrate the Opinions Clause as a strong political tool, 
hypotheticals in which the president must go through congress 
to achieve his ultimate policy objective are explored, supra. 
Early in his administration, President Trump issued an 
executive order seeking to prevent sanctuary cities from 
receiving federal grants.196  In County of Santa Clara v. Trump, 
the District Court found that the executive order violated 
separation of powers principles, the President’s duty under the 
Take Care Clause, and the Spending Clause.197  While the 
 
193.  FARRAND, supra note 68, at 342–43. 
194.  Id.; see also supra Part IV(B). 
195.  See supra Part IV(A); Prakash, supra note 13, at 1005–06 (referring 
to the complete timeline). 
196.  See Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799, § 9(a) (Jan. 25, 2017). 
197.  275 F. Supp. 3d 1196 (N.D. Cal. 2017), remanded by City & Cty. of 
S.F. v. Trump, 897 F.3d 1225 (9th Cir. 2018). 
54https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss1/5
ARTICLE 5_MURRAY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/28/2019  2:16 PM 
2018 EXECUTIVE POWER 283 
Trump administration has appealed this decision, this analysis 
will continue under the assumption that such unilateral 
executive action is unconstitutional.  Additionally, this article 
will posit that the intended action fits within the constitutional 
framework of the Spending Power established in South Dakota 
v. Dole and NFIB v. Sebelius, namely that congress can condition 
some federal funds on state actions so long as the sum is not so 
great so as to be coercive.198  In other words, this analysis 
assumes that the only limitation on the president’s desired 
action is the separation of powers: the conditions must originate 
in congress. 
Despite these constitutional restrictions, President Trump 
need not halt his effort to defund sanctuary cities—he only needs 
to follow his constitutional role.  If issuing an executive order 
threatening the removal of federal funds on the city’s failure to 
enforce federal immigration laws is invalid because Congress 
has the power of the purse, then the President should turn to 
Congress.  Here, the Opinions Clause would help the President 
make his case to the Congress, and if they fail to act, to the 
American people.  The President should use the same 
justification given for the executive order in the first place: 
Sanctuary Jurisdictions supposedly place their citizens at 
greater risk for violent crime.199 
At an event in Miami, Attorney General Jeff Sessions 
commended Miami-Dade County for complying with federal 
immigration laws before he chastised Chicago for, in his opinion, 
failing to protect its citizens.200  General Sessions linked 
Chicago’s high violent crime-rate in part to its continuing 
sanctuary policies.201  He stated broadly that “[e]very year too 
many Americans [sic] lives are victimized as a result of 
sanctuary city policies whether it be theft, robbery, drugs, 
assault, battery, and even murder.”202  Sessions even cited 
particular examples, including one of an alien who Chicago twice 
 
198.  Compare 483 U.S. 203 (1987), with 567 U.S. 519 (2012).  
199.  See, e.g., Jeff Sessions, Attorney Gen., Dep’t of Justice, Remarks on 
Sanctuary Policies (Aug. 16, 2017) (transcript https://www.justice.gov/opa 
/speech/attorney-general-sessions-delivers-remarks-sanctuary-policies).   
200.  Id. 
201.  Id. 
202.  Id. 
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refused to turn over to Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
for DUI arrests ultimately being sent back on the street to kill a 
victim.203 
President Trump could easily take this opinion from his 
principal officer to Congress, demanding that they take action to 
impose conditions on federal funds.  He could require General 
Sessions to further investigate and report the harms of 
Sanctuary City policies, citing to crime-statistics in such 
jurisdictions.  Alternatively, he could require the legal opinion of 
the Office of Legal Counsel, or counsel at ICE, to provide legal 
basis for federal action.  Either way, the President could use the 
bully-pulpit to build political pressure on the Congress.  If high-
profile crimes committed by aliens in sanctuary cities make the 
news, the ball would have been placed in Congress’ hands, and 
they could take the political heat.  If the President remains 
dissatisfied with congressional inaction, he could take the 
opinion to the American people on a campaign tour.  He could 
inspire his base voters to demand their Congressperson take 
appropriate action, and if that doesn’t work, he could demand 
and endorse new candidates to oppose incumbent 
representatives.  This effort would not just be typical campaign 
rhetoric, easily dismissed by political opponents.  Rather, the 
President could deploy the opinion of the nation’s Chief Law 
Enforcement Officer—facts and opinions from the person who 
knows.  At the very least, the President’s political opponents will 
need to reply with facts of their own, but they will not have the 
luxury of the Opinions Power over the Attorney General.204  In 
the end, voters hold their congressperson’s feet to the fire at 
election day on an issue that the President has no power over 
other than the Opinions Clause.  Speaking with a single, 
informed voice to the voters, he serves as a republican, 
nationally elected check on the factious Congress. 
Of course, the Opinions Clause also supports the president’s 
veto power, which is vital to the president’s role of a republican 
 
203.  Id. 
204.  They could file a FOIA request, or Congressional opponents could 
subpoena documents, but the process and time involved in such a request will 
put them at a distinct political disadvantage.  These opponents will not have 
the same bully pulpit as the President, who will speak with one voice and likely 
command the attention of the nation. 
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check on the congress.205  In the same manner as his affirmative 
legislative proposals, the president may require opinions of his 
cabinet to support his vetoing of any legislation passed by 
congress.  In fact, there is a textual link between the Veto Clause 
in Article I, Section 7 and the Opinions Clause.  The Veto Clause 
requires the president to return the bill “with his Objections,” 
which must be noted by the originating house of congress.206  The 
opinion given by the principal Officer could either constitute the 
entirety of this objection, or it could serve as the basis for the 
president’s own policy-based objection.  Either way, the veto 
clause pictures an informed president, which the Opinions 
Clause assures.207 
 
2. Unitary Judicial Tool 
 
The Opinions Clause also vests the president with unique 
abilities with respect to challenges in the judicial branch.  The 
president’s Opinions Power is classified into two different 
categories: an offensive power and a defensive power.  Under the 
offensive power, the president can use opinions to effectuate 
policy changes through the Courts, particularly in situations 
where he may be up against a binding statute and may not have 
a receptive congress.  These opinions take many forms, 
including, for example, policy papers, legal opinions, and factual 
reports that could be cited by independent parties in challenging 
statutes that the president must otherwise enforce.  These 
opinions, particularly if from the Office of Legal Counsel or the 
Attorney General, may also serve as establishing historical legal 
precedent, creating formal legal opinions that the Supreme 
Court can use as evidence of both historical practice and 
constitutional interpretation.  Under the defensive power, the 
president either preemptively gathers opinions to support the 
legality of his actions, or he uses the Opinions Power to gather 
 
205.  See supra Part IV(B) (explaining the historical comparison between 
the Council of Revision and the Opinions Clause). 
206.  U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 7, cl. 2.  
207.  See Amar, supra note 10, at 655–56. (explaining that his “coordinacy 
principle” states essentially that the Opinions Clause helps the president get 
on equal footing with the other branches, particularly the Congress through 
the Recommendation Clause, the State of the Union Clause, and the Veto with 
Objections Clause). 
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evidence to justify past actions being challenged in the courts. 
While the offensive Opinions Power may be rarely used, an 
analysis of its use shows that it is a potentially important and 
untapped reservoir of presidential authority.  For a recent high-
profile example, President Obama and then Attorney General 
Holder decided not to defend the constitutionality of the Defense 
of Marriage Act,208 a decision that arguably helped effectuate the 
Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Windsor, which 
held that the Defense of Marriage Act violated the Fifth 
Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection by denying same-
sex marriages federal benefits available to other legally-married 
couples.209  General Holder sent a letter to Speaker of the House 
John Boehner stating that while the Department of Justice 
would continue to enforce the law, they would no longer defend 
it against a constitutional challenge.210 
At first blush, this opinion has political and legislative 
value.  President Obama wins political support from those in 
favor of marriage equality211 despite previous instances where 
he waivered on the issue.212  Undoubtedly, the letter enables a 
national conversation to gain even more steam and traction.213  
If the President had a receptive Congress, the letter would help 
 
208.  See Charlie Savage & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, In Shift, U.S. Says 
Marriage Act Blocks Gay Rights, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2011), https://www. 
nytimes.com/2011/02/24/us/24marriage.html.  
209.  See generally 570 U.S. 744 (2013). 
210.  See Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney Gen., to John Boehner, 
Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, on Litigation Involving the 
Defense of Marriage Act (Feb. 23, 2011) (on file with the Dep’t of Justice), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/letter-attorney-general-congress-litigation-
involving-defense-marriage-act.  By enforcing the law, the Administration 
staved off “Take Care” challenges.  See also U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
211.  See Emily Guskin, Scott Clement, & Darla Cameron, While the 
Nation’s Economy Recovered, 6 in 10 Americans Said the Country Was on the 
Wrong Track, WASH. POST (Aug. 16, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com 
/graphics/national/obama-legacy/public-opinion-social-change.html 
(explaining public polling on same-sex marriage during the Obama presidency, 
with 61% approving by 2016). 
212.  See Hunter Schwarz, Obama’s Latest ‘Evolution’ on Gay Marriage: 




213.  See ROBERTA A. KAPLAN, THEN COMES MARRIAGE: UNITED STATES V. 
WINDSOR AND THE DEFEAT OF DOMA (Recorded Books 2015). 
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snap Congress into action to repeal a law the President deemed 
unconstitutional. 
But the opinion also serves the president’s interests in 
court.  In Windsor v. United States, the Plaintiffs cited the 
Holder letter in their successful motion for summary judgment, 
stating that as the “Attorney General has recognized [there is] 
‘a growing scientific consensus [that] accepts that sexual 
orientation is a characteristic that is immutable.’”214  The 
Plaintiff’s motion also cited General Holder’s opinion that 
Congress did not have a sufficient governmental interest to 
justify the denial of federal benefits to married same-sex couples 
under the Fifth Amendment’s Equal Protection doctrine.215  It is 
quite powerful for the Chief Law Enforcement Officer of the 
federal government to state that the federal government does 
not have a strong enough interest to meet constitutional 
requirements.  The Plaintiff not so subtly dropped the weight of 
the executive branch’s determination on the trial judge.  While 
the Trial Judge did not specifically refer to the letter, both she 
and the Second Circuit ruled that the statute was 
unconstitutional.216  Roberta A. Kaplan, Edith Windsor’s 
attorney, recognized the importance of the Holder opinion, 
writing that “[i]t is almost impossible to overstate how 
important this decision was for our side. . . . It is extremely 
unusual for the government to decline to defend federal laws, 
especially when doing so might come at a political cost.”217  
Ultimately, the Supreme Court held the Defense of Marriage Act 
unconstitutional.218  In all, the President used the offensive 
power inherent in the Opinions Clause to further a policy goal 
in the courts. 
In addition to opinions challenging statutes the president 
hopes the Court will overturn, the president can also use the 
offensive power to generate constitutional interpretations and 
historical precedent in situations where the Court may not have 
 
214.  Brief of Plaintiff at 18, 699 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2012) (Nos. 12–2335–
cv(L), 12–2435(Con)), 2011 WL 3165327. 
215.  Id. 
216.  See Windsor v. U.S., 833 F. Supp. 2d 394 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), aff’d, 699 
F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2012). 
217.  KAPLAN, supra note 213, at 145. 
218.  See Windsor, 699 F.3d at 210. 
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a reason to weigh in.219  Perhaps the most prevalent exercise of 
this power is the Office of Legal Counsel, which issues memos 
and opinions on the legality of executive branch actions.220  
Through these opinions, the president can build on the opinions 
of past administrations and develop a precedent of legal 
interpretation benefitting the office of the presidency.  Although 
Courts do not consider OLC opinions binding authority, Sonia 
Mittal documents their role as persuasive authority of an 
historical practice, thus serving as gap-fillers in cases not yet 
settled by the Court.221  To illustrate, the Court in Noel Canning 
v. NLRB adopted a broad interpretation of the Vacancy 
Appointments Clause based on the historical practice and 
balance reached by the political branches.  In so doing, the Court 
cited opinions from past Attorneys General and OLCs 
authorizing such broad vacancy appointments,222 giving 
significant evidentiary effect to these opinions. 
From a big picture perspective, the Court’s deference to 
these legal opinions written for presidents essentially cedes a 
portion of constitutional interpretation to the executive branch 
at the expense of both the judiciary and the congress.  The Court 
posited two separate readings of the Vacancy Appointments 
Clause, a narrow, restrictive reading and a broad reading.  
 
219.  See Sonia  Mittal,  OLC’s  Day  in  Court:  Judicial  Deference  to  the 
Office of Legal Counsel, 9 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 211 (2015); see also, John O. 
McGinnis, Models of the Opinion Function of the Attorney General: A 
Normative, Descriptive, and Historical Prolegomenon, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 375, 
376 (1993) (“many of the opinions are the final word on the law because judicial 
resolution of the legal issue is unavailable”). 
220.  Mittal, supra note 219, at 212.  First, we should briefly summarize 
the role these opinions play within the executive branch.  As Sonia Mittal 
points out, OLC memos serve as the legal authority for actions taken within 
the executive branch.  Id.  Oftentimes, this role requires the OLC to “resolve 
legal disputes between expert agencies,” thus serving as a unifying tool for the 
executive branch.  Id. (emphasis in original).  If the President finds that two of 
the expert agencies are in dispute, he can direct the Attorney General to 
require an opinion from the Office of Legal Counsel.  Id.  In this sense, the 
Opinions Clause is a power the President may use to unify the executive 
branch’s actions, even if he does not have the binding directive power over all 
of these agencies.   
221.  Id. at 218–19. 
222.  NLRB v. Canning, 134 S.Ct. 2550, 2562 (2014) (stating “[n]ot 
surprisingly, the publicly available opinions of Presidential legal advisers that 
we have found are nearly unanimous in determining that the Clause 
authorizes these appointments”). 
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Unsurprisingly, presidents and their attorneys general wanted 
the broad readings of their own power, so they issued opinions 
calling this a settled question.223  This particular case highlights 
how the unitary Opinions Clause gives the president a unique 
power to influence the Constitution through historical practices.  
The Court emphasized that the Senate has never taken any 
formal action to rebuke or contest the executive branch’s 
constitutional interpretation, but it acknowledged several 
occasions where individual senators and senate committees 
disagreed.224  On the other hand, the Court considered each 
individual opinion issued by an Attorney General or an Office of 
Legal Counsel to be formal enough to give it interpretive weight.  
In other words, the president’s request for an opinion from the 
OLC is a formal action interpreting the Constitution, whereas 
an individual senator’s or even senate committee’s statement is 
not given the same weight.  This imbalance gives the president 
a unique advantage based on the unitary power of the Opinions 
Clause.  The president can simply exercise the enumerated 
Opinions Power to generate legal opinions that could over time 
establish constitutional precedent. 
Furthermore, the Opinions Clause provides an effective 
defensive power for the president, allowing the president to 
gather written evidence to defend certain actions and achieve 
results in the courts.  One example of this defensive power is 
illustrated by the case challenging the Obama Administration’s 
designation of Anwar Al-Aulaqi on the Central Intelligence 
Agency’s alleged kill list.225  To defend the action brought by Al-
Aulaqi’s father, the United States cited a public declaration from 
then-Director of National Intelligence James Clapper, detailing 
factual findings of Al-Aulaqi.226  The District Court then 
dismissed the case, citing the Clapper opinion as evidence that 
Al-Aulaqi was able to come to the U.S. and challenge his status 
in court, but that he had no intention of doing so, precluding the 
 
223.  Id. at 2571 (citation omitted). 
224.  Id. at 2571–72.  
225.  Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 11 (D.D.C. 2010). 
226.  Brief of Defendant at 1, Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 
(D.D.C. 2010) (No. 10-1469(JDB)), 2010 WL 3863135 (stating that Al-Aulaqi 
was a leader of AQAP, setting strategies and directing terrorist attacks against 
the United States, including the attempted bombing of Northwest Airlines 
flight in 2009). 
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father from asserting next friend standing.227  Although 
President Obama may not have directly requested this opinion 
from DNI Clapper, this example shows the kind of opinion a 
president could require and then deploy defensively in litigation. 
As an additional hypothetical, President Obama could have 
required a report from the Secretary of Homeland Security on 
the need to set priorities for enforcement in advance of the DAPA 
case—Texas v. U.S.228  The president could then release this 
opinion to the DOJ to use in defending the actions as valid and 
legitimate enforcement discretion delegated to the president and 
the Department of Homeland Security by law.  Such facts on the 
ground might convince the Court that the actions are far more 
discretionary than they are actually suspending or rewriting the 
law.  As these examples illustrate, the president can use the 
Opinions Clause to generate evidence to defend his policies and 
actions in court. 
These two examples represent the power to generate 
evidence, but, recently, the Trump administration used the 
Opinions Clause to legitimate and give constitutional cover for 
otherwise corrupt motives.  At oral argument in Trump v. 
Hawaii, the Trump administration argued that the Supreme 
Court should not consider Trump’s anti-Muslim campaign 
statements in considering whether the travel ban was motivated 
by religious animus, in violation of the First Amendment.229  To 
justify this argument, the Government cited the Opinions 
Clause as a constitutional moment, transforming President 
Trump’s biased campaign opinions into presidential 
proclamations supported by the expert opinions of his 
Cabinet.230  In fact, Solicitor General Noel Francisco opened his 
 
227.  Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 19. 
228.  See generally 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015). 
229.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 28, 138 S.Ct. 2392 (2018) (No. 17-
965).   
230.  Id. at 29 (stating “we are very much of the view that campaign 
statements are made by a private citizen before he takes the oath of office and 
before, under the Opinions Clause of the Constitution, receives the advice of 
his cabinet, and that those are constitutionally significant acts that mark the 
fundamental transformation from being a private citizen to the embodiment of 
the executive branch”).  This argument is consistent with this article’s view of 
executive power, as it’s the oath that transforms Citizen Trump into President 
Trump—a Section One clause “naming” the President.  Then, President Trump 
exercises his Section Two power—the Opinions Clause—to support his 
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argument by describing the detailed multi-agency review, 
framing the case as the President merely adopting the 
Homeland Security Secretary’s recommendations.231  Here, the 
Trump administration introduces a new formulation of the 
Opinions Clause’s defensive power: Imbuing constitutionally 
questionable acts with the legitimate cover of expertise.232 
 
3. Unitary Executive Tool: For Cause Removal and 
Independent Agencies 
 
Perhaps most importantly for the broader debate over the 
executive power, the Opinions Clause grants the president with 
strong authority to unify the executive branch.  The Clause 
enables the president to design a coherent and unified 
enforcement and regulatory agenda.  The president can also use 
opinions he obtains under the Opinions Clause power as cause 
to remove even the most independent officers, or, at the very 
least, ensure that even the most independent agency is held 
accountable to the American people through their opinions.  
Again, because negative implications are inferred for the 
Vesting Clause and the broader executive power from the 
Opinions Clause, these powers are intentionally analyzed with 
respect to the unitary scholars’ worst nightmare: an 
independent agency.  Here, it is assumed that an independent 
agency is one where the director(s) cannot be removed at will by 
the president, and, as discussed above, the president may not 
direct specific action.  If the agency is headed by an inferior 
officer, then one can also assume congress barred the president 
from requiring the inferior officer report directly to him.  Still, 
this inferior officer will be subject to a principal officer’s duties 
for purposes of the Opinions Clause.233 
To begin, the Opinions Clause provides the president a tool 
 
proclamation, which the Government argues is authorized by 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1182(f)).  See id. 
231.  Id. at 3. 
232.  Ironically, the Trump administration uses the Opinions Clause to 
hide behind his cabinet—the exact opposite reading that Professor Prakash 
and framer James Iredell stated. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
233.  The Opinions Clause grants the president the power to require the 
principal officer report to him “upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their 
respective Offices.”  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
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to shape a coherent regulatory agenda.234  Even if a president 
cannot direct an agency to take a certain action, the president is 
at least guaranteed the ability to know that such an action is 
about to be taken.  As has been argued in the past, this 
procedural power allows the president to prepare the agencies 
he can direct to react and adapt to the incoming regime.235  If the 
particular policy enacted by the independent agency is 
particularly egregious, the president can seek to mitigate the 
harms elsewhere.  For instance, if the EPA236 issues a new 
regulation under § 402 of the Clean Water Act creating more 
stringent requirements for permits, the president could seek to 
ease the regulatory burden on businesses by instructing the 
Army Corps of Engineers to ease its regulatory authority over 
§ 404 permits under the same Act.237 
As explained above, the Office of Legal Counsel serves this 
unifying role for the president and the executive branch writ 
large.  The OLC steps in to resolve disputes between two 
competing agencies, delivering an opinion to the agency or the 
attorney general regarding the legal victor.238  The president 
could take a more active role in this process, particularly if the 
two competing agencies included an independent agency over 
which he had little control.  The president would have two 
procedural options to resolve these disputes.  First, he can either 
require the opinion in writing from the officers of the individual 
agencies about the legality of their work, and they in turn can 
submit the request to the Office of Legal Counsel.  Or, second, 
the president could make the request directly to the Office of 
Legal Counsel (or through the Attorney General).239  Either way, 
 
234.  See Sunstein & Strauss, supra note 31, at 200 (classifying the 
Opinions Clause as a procedural power allowing the President to consult and 
coordinate with the departments). 
235.  Id. 
236.  This hypothetical assumes, of course, that Congress has insulated 
the EPA from presidential authority. 
237.  See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1342, 44 (2012) (explaining that under the Clean 
Water Act, the EPA has authority for 402 permits issued to point sources, while 
the Army Corps of Engineers has authority over 404 permits for dredged or 
fill-material). 
238.  See Mittal, supra note 219, at 212. 
239.  See id.; see also Committee on Judiciary, U.S. House of 
Representatives v. Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 53 (D.C.C. 2008).  For the Office of 
Legal Counsel, the Attorney General serving as a buffer may be very 
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the Opinions Clause guarantees the president a constitutional 
power to settle disputes between actors in the vast executive 
branch. 
More importantly, the Opinions Clause vests the president 
with the more classical executive powers.  It provides the 
president with a backstop for the power to remove the 
independent officer: it is an opportunity to show cause.  One can 
foresee two potential procedures congress could layout to protect 
an executive branch official.  One, congress could grant the 
executive branch official the power to appeal the decision to an 
Article III court, requiring the executive branch to show cause.240  
Or, two, congress could require the president receive senate or 
congressional approval for the removal of the officer.241  In either 
instance, the president will be able to use the opinion as evidence 
of cause for removal.  As Professor Sidak pointed out, the refusal 
to give such an opinion would automatically provide cause for 
removal, as the individual officer would be violating their oath 
 
important.  Much has been made since the infamous “Torture Memo” about the 
impartiality of the Office of Legal Counsel and whether it is just a “rubber 
stamp.”  Mittal, supra note 219, at 212.  Direct presidential involvement in the 
OLC’s decision-making process may exacerbate this problem, as the OLC may 
feel the pressure to approve the President’s actions when the request comes 
from the President.  These concerns were not unfamiliar to the framers; at the 
North Carolina ratifying convention, James Iredell stated that the Opinions 
Clause would guard against President’s colluding with executive officers to 
corrupt their opinions, chiefly by having it in writing.  See ELLIOT, supra note 
54 at 108–10.  Additionally, early in our nation’s history, President 
Washington and the Senate considered the proper forum for deliberations over 
the treaty-making process.  See supra note 70 and accompanying text.  The two 
parties acknowledged that both branches would be harmed by having the 
President present for the debate on the Treaty: the President may be 
embarrassed by the rejection of his proposal, and the Senate may be tempered 
in its deliberation in the presence of the powerful office.  Id.  Likewise, the 
OLC, like all executive officials, may feel the same political pressure over its 
deliberation. 
240.  See Tara Golshan, What Republicans in Congress Say About Passing 
a Bill to Protect Robert Mueller, VOX (Apr. 10, 2018, 2:54 PM), https://www.vox. 
com/policy-and-politics/2018/3/29/17164408/constitutional-protecting-robert-
mueller-job-congress (explaining that this limitation is currently being 
contemplated by the proposed legislation to insulate Special Counsel Robert 
Mueller from President Trump’s removal authority). 
241.  See THE FEDERALIST NO. 69 (Alexander Hamilton) (describing senate 
advice and consent as the default practice for the displacement of executive 
officials and, although arguably wrong, this shows there was a greater deal of 
ambiguity over the removal power than the unitary scholars would like to 
admit). 
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of office.242  Assuming the officer writes the opinion, the 
president can use it as evidence for cause, particularly if there 
are false statements, incorrect statements of law, evidence that 
the agency is not following the law, or potentially even the 
president’s evaluation of the opinion and the officer’s abilities.243 
Admittedly, this removal-by-bad-opinion authority is 
weaker than the unitary scholars envision, but it recognizes the 
textual fact that the Take Care Clause imposes the duty on the 
president to see that the laws are faithfully executed.244  
Removing an officer who is protected by law and who is faithfully 
executing the laws passed by congress violates the president’s 
constitutional duty.  Thus, this forceful reading of the Opinions 
Clause and its implications for a more limited reading of 
executive power again reconciles Article II’s structure.  The 
president expressly has the Opinions Power while expressly 
having the Take Care duty.  By tying removal under restrictive 
laws to the president’s express constitutional power, we 
maintain the logic behind Article II.  If the executive branch is 
following and enforcing the law, how can the president be said 
to uphold his duty to take care that the laws be faithfully 
executed if he removes a law-abiding officer who has not violated 
their duty? 
Still, this restricted reading of the executive power through 
the Opinions Clause does not render the president completely 
powerless. In fact, as detailed in the legislative section above, 
the Opinions Clause vests the president with a great political 
tool that he can use to instill executive accountability that may 
be lost through restricted removal.  Again, assuming the most 
independent agency, the president will still have the authority 
to get any and all information about the duties of the executive 
branch.  Thus, the president will be able to apprise himself of 
the independent agencies proposed actions, current actions, and 
past policy directives.  He could even require the other agencies 
 
242.  Sidak, supra note 57, at 2087 (stating “the President can remove 
those who produce faulty or injudicious opinions”). 
243.  This last element is obviously quite subjective and could be an 
exception that swallows the rule.  But there are no rigid rules here, and the 
President will only be bound by their ability to convince whichever body is 
charged with providing the procedural check. 
244.  U.S. CONST.  art. II § 3, cl. 5. 
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to report their opinions on the impacts on their fields of the 
independent agency’s activity.  The president can then use these 
opinions and go to congress or the American people to make the 
political case against the independent agency. 
For instance, President Trump may have sympathetic ears 
in his base for arguments against the independent Consumer 
Finance Protection Bureau.245  Under this vision of the 
Presidency, President Trump could require the CFPB to provide 
him with their opinions and reports on all of their proposed and 
current activity.  President Trump then takes these opinions and 
reports to the American people on a cross-country tour against 
the overreaching and liberty-infringing CFPB, rallying his base 
to the point where they hold as a litmus test for potential 
candidates for Congress whether they support eliminating the 
CFPB or subjecting it to plenary presidential discretion.246  In 
the end, the President can force an independent agency to sell 
their every move to any audience the President can muster, 
including the American people as a whole.  If the President 
cannot make this case through the American people, then the 
law should not change as a constitutional matter.  The 
constitutional system and its intended accountability has 
worked—the President provided a republican check on the 
potentially overreaching Congress by speaking with a singular 
voice to the American people about the evils of an independent 
CFPB.  The CFPB essentially had to convince the American 
people that it adds value to our government. Also, Congress’s 
previous decision to insulate the CFPB’s mission and mandate 
from politically motivated direction was not violated.  Through 
this vision, executive branch accountability, republican checks 
on Congress, and Congress’s power to make the laws as 
representatives of the people were all upheld.  By contrast, 
reading plenary removal power into the Presidency not only 
contradicts the text of the Constitution, but it would contradict 
the individual policy decisions made by the people’s 
representatives in Congress. 
 
245.  See, e.g., Diane Katz, The CFPB in Action: Consumer Bureau Harms 
Those It Claims to Protect, BACKGROUNDER, no. 2760, Jan. 22, 2013, 
https://www.heritage.org/housing/report/the-cfpb-action-consumer-bureau-
harms-those-it-claims-protect. 
246.  See supra Part IV(B)(1). 
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VI. The Current Opinions Clause: President Trump and the 
Independence of Law Enforcement 
 
The Opinions Clause interpreted in this article has 
important implications for the current debate over the meaning 
of executive power.  Without question, President Trump, in his 
interactions with former FBI Director James Comey, has 
sparked a debate over the proper role of the President with 
respect to the ideal of independent and apolitical law 
enforcement.247  This section analyzes President Trump’s firing 
of James Comey as a failed attempt at the proper use of the 
Opinions Clause and discusses President Trump’s interactions 
with Director Comey and U.S. Attorney Preet Bharara, two 
inferior officers, including how those interactions contradict the 
longstanding norms of the Justice Department.  Both of these 
discussions compare President Trump to President Washington, 
whose expert use of the Opinions Clause serves as a useful 
contrast.  Finally, Part B outlines the legislative steps congress  
could take in light of the negative implications of the Opinions 
Clause to limit future presidential overreach with respect to the 
Department of Justice. 
 
A.  President Trump, the Failed Attempt at the Opinions  
       Power and Presidential Overreach 
 
President Trump exercised the Opinions Power in his 
decision to remove FBI Director James Comey.  Deputy Attorney 
General Rod Rosenstein testified to the Senate Judiciary 
Committee that President Trump sought his “advice and 
input”248 on the decision to remove FBI Director Comey.249  
 
247.  Compare Jack Goldsmith, Independence and Accountability at the 
Department of Justice, LAWFARE BLOG (Jan. 30, 2018, 2:16 PM), 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/independence-and-accountability-department-
justice, with Robert Litt, FBI Independence—Too Much of a Good Thing?, 
LAWFARE BLOG (July 17, 2017, 10:00 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/fbi-
independence%E2%80%94too-much-good-thing.  
248.  Rod J. Rosenstein, U.S. Deputy Att. Gen., Briefing for the Members 
of the United States Senate and House of Representatives, 2 (May 18–19, 2017) 
(transcript available at 
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/3727183/Untitleddocument.pdf). 
249.  See Transcript: Jeff Sessions’ Testimony on Trump and Russia, 
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Rosenstein’s memo to the Attorney General stated that the FBI 
needed new leadership based on his disagreement with the 
actions taken by Director Comey during the investigation into 
former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.250  Then, following the 
Unitary Executive Tool outlined above, President Trump 
attached the opinion from Deputy Attorney General Rosenstein 
as adopted by Attorney General Sessions to his letter to Director 
Comey, stating that he had “accepted their recommendation” 
and that Comey was “hereby terminated and removed from 
office, effective immediately.”251  President Trump also used 
these opinions as a unitary political tool—releasing Rosenstein’s 
memo in the hopes that it would give him the political cover for 
firing Director Comey.252 
In sum, President Trump seemingly showed expertise in his 
use of the Opinions Power in the immediate time of the firing of 
 
POLITICO (June 13, 2017, 7:45 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2017/06/13/ 
full-text-jeff-session-trump-russia-testimony-239503.  It’s unclear whether 
President Trump went directly to the Deputy Attorney General, an inferior 
officer, or instead went through the Attorney General.  We know that the 
President asked Attorney General Jeff Sessions for his recommendation, and 
that Rosenstein sent the memo to the Attorney General, who then adopted the 
recommendations and submitted them to the President.  Id.  These facts 
suggest that the President followed the Opinions Clause hierarchy and went 
through the principal officer.  Either way, there is no law on the books 
restricting the President’s Opinions Power over DOJ inferior officers.  
However, even if there was such a law, the President would still have been able 
to gather the Department’s recommendations through the principal officer, 
Attorney General Jeff Sessions. 
250.  Memorandum from Rod J. Rosenstein, Deputy Attorney Gen., to the 
Attorney General, Restoring Public Confidence in the FBI (May 9, 2017), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/05/rosenstein-letter-
annotated/526116/. 
251.  See William Cummings, Full Text of Trump’s Letter Telling Comey 
He’s Fired, USA TODAY (May 9, 2017, 9:06 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/ 
story/news/politics/onpolitics/2017/05/09/full-text-trump-letter-comey-
firing/101491982/; Letter from Jeff Sessions, Attorney Gen., to Donald Trump, 
U.S. President (May 9, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/ 
onpolitics/2017/05/09/full-text-trump-letter-comey-firing/101491982/ 
(concurring in Rosenstein’s judgment); see also supra Part IV(B)(3) for 
discussion on the Unitary Executive Tool. 
252.  See Peter Baker & Michael D. Shear, Trump Shifts Rationale for 
Firing Comey, Calling Him a ‘Showboat,’ N.Y. TIMES, (May 11, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/11/us/politics/trump-comey-showboat-
fbi.html; see also supra Part IV(B)(1) for discussion on the Unitary Political 
Tool. 
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James Comey.253  Just as President Washington requested the 
opinions of his Cabinet on the Whiskey Rebellion, Trump 
requested the opinions of his Cabinet on the merits of firing 
Comey.  Additionally, like President Washington’s use of his 
principal officers’ opinions as evidence in intra-branch and inter-
branch decisions, Trump claimed to act on such advice in his 
decision to fire Director Comey.  Finally, much like the debate 
between Hamilton and Randolph on whether to name and 
shame the rebels, Trump and his administration ultimately 
decided to release Rosenstein’s letter to give political cover for 
his decision to fire Comey.  Unfortunately, unlike Washington, 
Trump directly contradicted this justification within 48 hours in 
an interview with NBC News, stating that he had already 
decided to fire Comey without Rosenstein’s opinion and 
mentioning the Russia investigation as part of his thinking.254 
Furthermore, President Trump has shown he is unwilling 
to rely on his principal officers, instead speaking directly to the 
inferior officer handling the individual matter.  Early on in his 
administration, President Trump established the precedent of 
speaking privately with former FBI Director James Comey.  
These one-on-one communications run afoul of norms 
established in the justice system shortly after Watergate, norms 
intended to insulate the law enforcement community from 
improper influence.255  These communications also show that 
President Trump does not share in President Washington’s 
awareness of presidential power and its potentially corrupting 
influence, as exemplified by Washington’s decision to abstain 
 
253.  See Omnibus Crime Control & Safe Streets, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 
Stat. 197 (1968), amended by Pub. L. No. 94-503, 90 Stat. 2407 (1976); Pub. L. 
No. 112-24, 125 Stat. 238 (2011).  Confusingly, the authorizing statute for the 
FBI Director vests the appointment power in the Attorney General and, in the 
revision notes, the power is vested in the President.  Either way, the statute 
does not clearly state that the President cannot remove the Director without 
cause, and, as discussed below, a clear statement rule likely applies to these 
restrictions. 
254.  See Baker & Shear, supra note 252; see also supra Part V(A) for 
discussion of Washington’s use of the Opinions Clause. 
255.  See, e.g., Memorandum from Eric Holder, U.S. Attorney Gen., to 
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while the Senate debated nominees.256  To reiterate, Washington 
recognized the power of the Presidency, and how the 
Constitution not only allowed for but perhaps necessitated the 
political branches to establish some safeguards for the proper 
exercise of government. 
In the post-Watergate world, this same awareness of the 
potentially corrupting power of the presidency reappeared in the 
relationship between the President and Department of Justice.  
However, unlike Washington’s inter-branch compromise with 
the Senate above, the post-Watergate Presidents have struck an 
intra-branch balance with their Attorneys General to guard 
against the improper political influence on the inner workings of 
the DOJ.  As a result, Attorneys General issued guidelines that 
established walls between the White House and the inferior and 
civil officers in the Department of Justice.257 
Attorney General Eric Holder’s guidelines provide a useful 
illustration of the balance between presidential power and 
shielding against improper political influence.258  The guidelines 
explicitly state that all initial communications from the White 
House should be directed exclusively to either the Attorney 
General or the Deputy Attorney General, and, if continued 
updates on a pending investigation are required, the Attorney 
General may designate a subordinate officer as the contact 
person, but that subordinate must regularly inform the Attorney 
General of these contacts.259  Furthermore, Holder’s guidelines 
regulate the President’s requests for legal advice from the Office 
of Legal Counsel, stipulating that those requests must include 
the Attorney General in addition to the Assistant Attorney 
General for the Office of Legal Counsel, who must inform the 
General of any contacts from the White House deemed to be 
improper political influences.260  Finally, Holder reiterates the 
 
256.  See supra Part III(B), notes 70–71 and accompanying text.  
257.  See Massimo Calabresi, The FBI Talked to the White House About 
Its Russia Probe. That Was Probably Against the Rules, TIME (Feb. 25, 2017), 
http://time.com/4682791/fbi-russia-reince-priebus-andrew-mccabe-justice-
rules/; Memorandum from Donald F. McGahn II, Counsel to the U.S. 
President, to All White House Staff (Jan. 27, 2017), https://www.politico.com 
/f/?id=0000015a-dde8-d23c-a7ff-dfef4d530000. 
258.  Memorandum from Holder, supra note 255. 
259.  Id. at 2. 
260.  Id. at 3. 
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purpose stated in the prior administration guidelines: “[w]hat 
these procedures are intended to do is route communications to 
the proper officials so they can be adequately reviewed and 
considered, free from either the reality or the appearance of 
improper influence.”261 
Attorney General Griffin B. Bell’s 1978 address was even 
more explicit on the screening role of the Attorney General.  
Although Holder’s address expressly supersedes the prior 
memos,262 it’s still useful to see how previous Attorneys General 
have seen their role as the principal officer in charge of the DOJ. 
Bell stated that it was his “job to screen these communications 
to insure [sic] that any improper attempts to influence a decision 
do not reach the Assistant Attorney General.  Any relevant 
information or legal argument will, of course, be passed on.”263  
Although this is self-imposed discipline on behalf of the 
executive branch, Bell and President Carter established the 
restricted hierarchy allowed by the Opinions Clause by routing 
all communications through the Attorney General.  Bell also 
played the role of a filter, intercepting and stopping 
communications from the White House that he deemed 
improper.264 
In the initial examination of these guidelines, we see that 
the DOJ and by extension, the Executive Branch as a whole, 
restricted itself in a similar vein to the negative implications in 
the Opinions Clause.  While the Holder memo does not cite the 
Opinions Clause, it clearly establishes that the President should 
direct inquiries to the principal officer rather than the inferior 
officers.  The principal officer, in this case the Attorney General, 
then assumes the responsibility of reviewing the information 
requested and facilitating its communication to the White House 
in the least-improper way.  Clearly, the post-Watergate 
Department of Justice guidelines reflect the same concern of 
improper influence that Washington shared with the First 
Senate.  Although these restrictions are not imposed by 
 
261.  Id. at 4.  
262.  Id. (superseding the 2007 memo issued by Attorney General Michael 
Mukasey). 
263.  Griffin B. Bell, U.S. Attorney Gen., Address before Department of 
Justice Lawyers 7–8 (Sept. 6, 1978) (on file with the Dep’t of Justice). 
264.  Id. 
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congress, they reflect a self-imposed decision that the executive 
power of the Vesting Clause should not include demanding 
inferior officers of the DOJ report directly to the President.265 
President Trump, on the other hand, ignored these 
guidelines and norms with respect to two inferior Officers:266 
former FBI Director James Comey and Former U.S. Attorney 
Preet Bharara.  Interestingly, the reactions of both individuals 
highlight the shaky ground President Trump stood on when he 
made these improper contacts.  James Comey testified to the 
Senate that he “spoke alone with President Obama twice in 
person” during his tenure in the Obama administration, while 
he had “nine one-on-one conversations with President Trump in 
four months.”267  Comey went on to describe one of the early 
meetings with President Trump – a one-on-one dinner with the 
President in which Comey felt that the President wished to 
“create some sort of patronage relationship.”268  This meeting 
and such a patronage relationship concerned Comey “greatly, 
given the FBI’s traditionally independent status in the executive 
branch.”269  Already, we see Comey’s instincts reflect the post-
Watergate policies of a politically-independent FBI in which it 
would be inappropriate for a president to have a conversation 
with the Director, an inferior officer, alone. 
Perhaps the most striking meeting occurred on February 14, 
2017, when President Trump asked the Vice President, the 
Deputy Director of the CIA, the Director of the National 
Counter-Terrorism Center, Secretary of Homeland Security and 
the Attorney General to clear the room so that he could speak to 
Comey alone.270  Tellingly, the Attorney General lingered next 
 
265.  If imposed by Congress, such restrictions on the President’s 
authority would certainly be unconstitutional under the Unitary Executive 
theory.  As Professors Calabresi and Prakash argued, one of the powers vested 
in the President by the Vesting Clause is the power to act in the inferior 
officer’s stead or to nullify any actions that officer takes.  See Calabresi & 
Prakash, supra note 16. 
266.  Memorandum from McGahn, supra note 257 (which Trump 
apparently violated). 
267.  Read James Comey’s Prepared Remarks for Testimony, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/06/07/us/politics/ 
document-Comey-Prepared-Remarks-Testimony.html.  
268.  Id. 
269.  Id. 
270.  Id. 
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to Comey, but Trump again instructed Sessions to leave the 
room.271  Once alone, President Trump told Comey that he wants 
to talk about Michael Flynn, the recently fired National Security 
Advisor who has since pleaded guilty to lying to the FBI.272  
According to Comey’s testimony, Trump told him that Michael 
Flynn “is a good guy and. . .I hope you can see your way clear to 
letting this go, to letting Flynn go.”273  Here, we see the exact 
type of communication that the post-Watergate memos sought 
to limit—the President using his Office and his political 
presence to influence an inferior officer in the investigation of a 
political friend of the President.  Under the Griffin Bell and Eric 
Holder guidelines, such a communication should have been 
directed to the Attorney General, who would have then refused 
to pass along the request to the FBI.274 
Comey’s actions after this meeting underscore his 
discomfort and the questionable authority of the President to 
make such an order directly to the FBI Director.  Comey testified 
that he shared the contents of the conversation with an 
immediate team of senior leadership at the FBI, and that they 
agreed that “it was important not to infect the investigative 
team with the President’s request, which we did not intend to 
abide.”275  There are two takeaways from this portion of the 
testimony, which speak to the negative implications of the 
Opinions Clause.  One, Comey and his leadership team decided 
to ignore the order of the President, clearly showing that the FBI 
Director did not recognize the President’s authority to issue such 
a directive.  Thus, either Comey was disobeying his Oath of 
Office to uphold the Constitution of the United States, or the 
Executive Power of the Vesting Clause does not fill in the gap 
left by the Opinions Clause – the top-down directive to an 
 
271.  Id. 
272.  Michael D. Shear & Adam Goldman, Michael Flynn Pleads Guilty to 
Lying to the F.B.I. and Will Cooperate with Russia Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 1, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/01/us/politics/michael-flynn-guilty-
russia-investigation.html.  
273.  Read James Comey’s Prepared Remarks for Testimony, supra note 
267. 
274.  Bell, supra note 263, at 7–8. 
275.  Read James Comey’s Prepared Remarks for Testimony, supra note 
267. 
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inferior officer.276  Two, Comey and his team decided to not 
inform the investigators of the President’s request, a decision 
that implicitly recognizes the potential for improper political 
influence on investigative matters.277 
Comey also communicated his discomfort with the private 
conversation to Attorney General Sessions, illustrating his belief 
in the hierarchy set up by the DOJ guidelines.  After the Flynn 
conversation, Comey 
 
Took the opportunity to implore the Attorney 
General to prevent any future direct 
communication between the President and [him]. 
[He] told the AG that what had just happened—
him being asked to leave while the FBI Director, 
who reports to the AG, remained behind—was 
inappropriate and should never happen.278 
 
In other words, Comey understood that he, as an inferior 
officer, reported to the principal officer—Attorney General 
Sessions—and not directly to the President. 
U.S. Attorney Preet Bharara shared Comey’s concerns over 
the President’s authority to communicate directly with him, a 
fellow inferior officer.279  Interestingly, Bharara reports that 
while initial conversations after the election were 
uncomfortable, he answered the President-elect’s phone calls 
because “he was not the President.”280  However, when President 
Trump called him again on March 9, 2017, Bharara did not 
 
276.  This is not to say that Director Comey and his team believed the 
President lacked the constitutional authority to make such an order under the 
Vesting Clause or based on a belief on the Opinions Clause.  Rather, it is 
intended to show that his actions fit with this article’s reading of both the 
Opinions Clause and the Vesting Clause.  
277.  This recognition of the power of the Presidency to infect otherwise 
independent decision making is the same recognition that drove President 
Washington’s absence from the First Senate’s deliberations. 
278.  Read James Comey’s Prepared Remarks for Testimony, supra note 
267 (emphasis added). 
279.  Matthew Haag, Preet Bharara Says Trump Tried to Build 
Relationship with Him Before Firing, N.Y. TIMES (June 11, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/11/us/politics/preet-bharara-trump 
contacts.html (calling Comey’s testimony “deja vu”). 
280.  Id. 
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return the phone call and instead reported the contact to the 
Attorney General.281  Bharara’s juxtaposition of his willingness 
to speak with citizen Trump with his unwillingness to speak 
with President Trump demonstrates his belief in the hierarchy 
established by the DOJ guidelines, a hierarchy that also fits with 
this article’s reading of the Opinions Clause.282 
Comey and Bharara quite clearly echo the concerns 
grounded in the DOJ guidelines in the post-Watergate world.  To 
them, the President’s attempt to influence inferior officers and 
their decisions on individual investigations was an 
inappropriate and overreaching exercise of executive power.  
Rod Rosenstein apparently agrees, appointing Special Counsel 
Robert Mueller to investigate the President’s actions 
surrounding Comey’s firing.283  While Special Counsel Mueller’s 
investigation continues, some scholars have argued that 
President Trump’s constitutional authority immunizes him from 
prosecution or impeachment for this conduct.284  Others have 
argued that legislation protecting Robert Mueller from 
President Trump’s removal authority would be 
unconstitutional.285  To some degree, both of these arguments 
rest on the modern unitary executive theory, namely that the 
Vesting Clause provides the President with an absolute power 
to fire or direct any officer within the executive branch.  The next 
 
281.  Id. 
282.  Id. 
283.  Appointment of Special Counsel to Investigate Russian Interference 
with the 2016 Presidential Election and Related Matters, Order No. 3915-207 
(2017) (“Special Counsel is authorized to conduct the investigation confirmed 
by then-FBI Director James B. Comey”). 
284.  See Anna Giaritelli, Alan Dershowitz: ‘You Cannot Charge a 
President with Obstruction of Justice for Exercising His Constitutional Power,’ 
WASH. EXAMINER (Dec. 4, 2017, 8:14 AM), https://www.washington 
examiner.com/alan-dershowitz-you-cannot-charge-a-president-with-
obstruction-of-justice-for-exercising-his-constitutional-power (arguing that the 
President exercised his constitutional authority to fire Comey and to tell the 
DOJ who to investigate, and thus cannot be prosecuted). 
285.  Neal K. Katyal & Kenneth W. Starr, Opinion, A Better Way to Protect 
Mueller, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/19/ 
opinion/protect-mueller-russia-prosecutor.html (“The Constitution vests the 
President with the power over prosecutors, and it is hard to imagine courts 
permitting Congress to place serious restrictions on that power”).  Instead, 
Katyal and Starr argue for a “Bork regulation,” in which the Attorney General 
issues a regulation stating that the President will only be able to fire the 
Special Counsel with Congress’ consent.  Id. 
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section explains why both of these arguments are wrong and 
what congress can do to better guard against this form of 
presidential overreach. 
 
B.  Congress Can Protect Against Presidential Overreach  
       in the FBI 
 
The constitutional interpretation of both the Opinions 
Clause and Article II outlined in this article enables the congress 
to guard against the improper exercise of presidential power.  To 
do so, congress can pass the DOJ guidelines discussed in Part A 
into law, insulating investigative officials from the political 
pressures of the White House.  Although congress does not gain 
any authority from Article II, it can pass such restrictions under 
the Necessary and Proper Clause.  As established in removal 
cases such as Buckley v. Valeo, congress has the power under the 
Necessary and Proper Clause to shield executive agencies from 
improper political influence.286  Here, it is necessary and proper 
for Congress to insulate the Department of Justice to provide for 
the independent and non-corrupt execution of the laws—laws 
Congress clearly has the Article I Section 8 power to enact.  
Then, Article II, through the three negative implications of the 
Opinions Clause, allows for these protections.  To reiterate, the 
Opinions Clause and the other power clauses within Article II 
Section Two mean that the president does not have an absolute 
power to take any action that is not expressly included.  As 
outlined above, all other actions can be regulated.  As a result, 
the Opinions Clause, by its limitations, means that the president 
does not have an absolute power to require inferior officers 
report directly to him, to remove at-will all officers, or to direct 
officers to take specific actions.287 
Thus, congress can regulate the president’s interactions 
with the inferior officers within the Department of Justice.288  In 
 
286.  See Steele & Bowman, supra note 76. 
287.  See supra Part III(B). 
288.  See Barry H. Berke, Noah Bookbinder, & Norman L. Eisen, 
Presidential Obstruction of Justice: The Case of Donald J. Trump BROOKINGS 
(2017), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/presidential-
obstruction-of-justice-the-case-of-donald-j-trump-final.pdf.  Quite possibly, 
Congress has already regulated these interactions with the obstruction of 
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other words, congress could pass a statute codifying the 
regulatory guidelines issued by the post-Watergate Attorneys 
General, requiring that White House communications go 
through the Attorney General and not directly to the inferior 
officer in charge of the investigation.  Of course, the Opinions 
Clause prevents congress from completely insulating the 
Department of Justice or insulating any particular matter from 
the president’s review.  The Clause gives the president the power 
to inquire about any subject within the particular executive 
department, thus giving the president an express textual power 
to inquire about any matters within the DOJ, so long as he 
communicates through the Attorney General.289  Nevertheless, 
such a law would avoid the political pressures on the FBI 
Director or the U.S. Attorney, facilitating greater independence 
in the justice system.290 
Congress can also pass a statute insulating the Special 
Counsel or the FBI Director from removal at the pleasure of the 
president.  Again, because the Opinions Clause is a limited 
textual grant, the president cannot claim based on the text of the 
Constitution an absolute power to fire any officer within the 
executive branch.  Of course, as outlined above, the president 
could use the Opinions Clause to find such cause for removal.  
For instance, President Trump likely could have gone to the 
Senate or to a court and submitted Rod Rosenstein’s memo as 
evidence for cause to remove FBI Director Comey, but that 
process would have had the added potential of detecting the true 
reason behind the firing. 
Finally, congress could pass a law restricting the president’s 
authority to order or stop investigations into specific individuals.  
The Opinions Clause, by empowering the president with the 
absolute power only to require reports from the officers, does not 
expressly vest the power to issue orders to those officers.  
Therefore, in order to avoid politically motivated prosecutions 
and investigations, congress could deny the president the 
authority to order the FBI to investigate or not investigate a 
specific individual.  Such a law avoids any future scenes like the 
 
justice statutes. 
289.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
290.  See Haag, supra note 279; Read James Comey’s Prepared Remarks 
for Testimony, supra note 267. 
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one Director Comey described in the Oval Office, in which 





Professor Amar’s statement that the Opinions Clause and 
its implications are “both timely and timeless” is as true today 
as ever.292  By analyzing the text and context of the clause, we 
gain a greater sense of the executive power the framers 
designed, and, more importantly, a greater sense of what they 
left to us.  President Washington knew the power of information 
within the executive branch, and we saw him use it to his and 
the nation’s advantage in ending the Whiskey Rebellion.  On the 
other hand, the Opinions Clause and its implications answer the 
questions raised about some of President Trump’s actions.  We 
need not concede this fight when scholars cloak presidential 
overreach in an ambiguous and vast reservoir of executive 
power.  Instead, we can look to the Opinions Clause, the 
Constitution’s only textual power grant for the president over 
the day-to-day administration of the federal government.  We  
can understand its energy and vigor for a president seeking to 
further political goals.  Nevertheless, perhaps most timely, we 
recognize its flexibility, and the safeguards it and the framers 
allowed us to design. 
 
 
291.  Id. 
292.  Amar, supra note 10, at 647.  
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